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BLACK MARKET LAW FIRMS
Casey E. Faucont
In business and in competition, value exists in striking first. Accountants, the so-
called hawks of the professional world, have made the first move. In September 2017,
the global accounting iant PwC opened a law firm in Washington, D.C. called ILC
Legal. ILC Legal not only provides legal services on on-domestic matters, but also acts
as a multidisciplinary provider (MDP) and offers other professional services, such as
tax-planning, business consulting, and marketing, throughout its ninety-country
network. In June 2018, Deloitte quickly followed suit, the second of the Big Four
accounting firms to enter the U.S. MDP market, partnering with a U.S. immigration
law firm in San Francisco. With accountants now having the 'first mover" advantage,
the legal profession must respond.
Restricting any competitive response are the legal profession's current ethical
rules. Two weaknesses in the legal profession's integrity system-the self-regulatory
market monopoly over legal services and the ethical treatment of all lawyering acts
under a unified profession of law-have restricted collaborative innovations between
lawyers and non-lawyers. No more pronounced are larger impacts of these weaknesses
to the overall competitiveness of the legal profession than when viewed through the
exemplar of Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 5.4, which protects the
professional independence of a lawyer through prohibiting non-lawyer ownership of
law firms. This rule has not stopped accountants, however, from hiring lawyers en
masse to deliver legal services to their business and tax clients; nor has the rule stopped
enterprising lawyers from collaborating with non-lawyer professionals in an attempt
to keep pace and to provide more holistic and comprehensive l gal services to clients.
t Casey E. Faucon is an Assistant Professor and Director of the Entrepreneurship & Nonprofit
Clinic at the Hugh F. Culverhouse Jr. School of Law at the University of Alabama. The author would
like to thank Patience Crowder, Kevin Lynch, Janet Goode, Erik Franklin Amarante, Matthew
Rossman, Susan Jones, Courtney Cross, Allyson Gold, Ron Krotoszynski, Nicole Godfrey, Rachel
Moran, Timothy Estep, Laura Rovner, Tamara Kuennen, Nantiya Ruan, and Lindsey Webb for
providing feedback on previous drafts and presentations.
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This Article calls for recognition and regulation of MDPs because the legal
profession must now overcome the accountants'first mover advantages. Despite this
initial competitive setback, the legal profession is also now in a position to leverage its
current self-regulatory monopoly over legal services to market higher quality, ABA and
state ethics board-accredited MDP services to clients. This Article then proposes a
regulatory framework for recognizing and regulating MDPs based on a classification
scheme which categorizes MDPs based on the potential risk that the ownership and
control structure could undermine a lawyer's independent judgment. This novel
classification scheme categorizes MDPs as either white, gray, or black market law firms
depending on the percentage of non-lawyer majority ownership and control of the
MDP. Based on those categories, this Article argues that we should revise Rule 5.4 to
allow for unlimited associationalforms between lawyers and non-lawyer professionals
but prohibit lawyers from providing legal services in black market MDPs, or MDPs
which are majority owned and controlled by non-lawyers.
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INTRODUCTION
Adapt or perish, now as ever, is Nature's inexorable imperative.
-H.G. Wells1
"How the hell we find ourselves in second place in a two-man race?"2
On September 21, 2017, The American Lawyer first reported that PwC,
one of the remaining Big Four accounting firms,3 opened its first U.S. law
firm in Washington, D.C.4 The law firm, called ILC Legal, operates
separately from the accounting firm but assists U.S. clients on
international business issues.5 The American Lawyer first noticed the new
law firm after ILC Legal filed numerous trademark registrations, and
PwC updated its website to include "ILC Legal."6 Deemed a "wake-up
H.G. WELLS, MIND AT THE END OF ITS TETHER 19 (1945).
2 HIDDEN FIGURES (20th Century Fox 2016) (director of NASA expressing dismay after the
Soviets sent a man into orbit around Earth before the United States).
3 Chris Johnson, PwC to Launch U.S. Law Firm as Big Four Expand Legal Offerings, AM. LAW.
(Sept. 21, 2017, 5:33 PM), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202798366190/PwC-to-Launch-
US-Law-Firm-as-Big-Four-Expand-Legal-Offerings?slreturn=20170915150758 [https://perma.cc/
VT6V-29D6]. PwC, formerly known as Pricewaterhouse Coopers, is one of the four remaining "Big
Four" accounting firms, which also includes Deloitte, Ernst & Young, and KPMG. Chris Johnson,
Accounting Firms Make New Foray into Legal Services, AM. LAW. (July 30, 2014, 12:00 AM)
[hereinafter Johnson, Accounting Firms], http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202664265927/
Accounting-Firms-Make-New-Foray-into-Legal-Services [https://perma.cc/VT6V-29D6].
4 Johnson, supra note 3.
5 Id.
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call" to the legal profession, an accounting firm's push into the
international legal market sent shock waves throughout the legal
community.7 In June 2018, Deloitte UK followed in PwC's shoes and
partnered with a San Francisco-based law firm to give U.S. businesses
market access to Deloitte's global immigration services. 8 The accountants
have struck first. Now the lawyers must respond.
The American Bar Association's reaction over the past hree decades
to the growing global movement of accountants providing legal services
to their corporate clients has been to formally prohibit such activity in the
United States.9 These prohibitions have not stopped the accountants,
however, from navigating a path through the technical breakwaters and
finding a way to offer legal services to corporate clients:10 PwC already
has over 2,500 lawyers in its international networks."1 Nonlawyers
clamoring for a share of the over $437 billion a year legal services market
continue to develop creative methods to play outside of the bounds of the
restrictive legal services field. 12 Nor have the rules stopped enterprising
legal entrepreneurs from trying to keep pace.13 Some legal scholars study
7 Nicholas Bruch, PwC's Entry into the U.S. Legal Market Is Important-Just Not for the
Reasons You Think It Is, LAW.COM (Sept. 22, 2017, 12:52 PM), http://www.law.com/sites/ali/2017/
09/22/pwcs-entry-into-the-us-legal-market-is-important-just-not-for-the -r asons-you-think-it-is
[https://perma.cc/788A-BU9C]; Chris Johnson, PwC Makes Push into U.S. Legal Market with
Launch of Washington DC Firm, LAW.COM (Sept. 21, 2017, 4:22 AM), http://www.law.com/sites/
legalweek/2017/09/21/pwc-makes-push-into-us-legal-market-with-launch-of-washington-dc-
firm [https://perma.cc/SPU3-Z5TV].
8 See Dan Packer, Deloitte Will Acquire Part of U.S. Law Firm in New Venture, AM. LAW. (June
6, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2018/06/06/deloitte-will-acquire-part-
of-us-law-firm-in-new-legal-venture/?slreturn=20180719134535 [https://perma.cc/YHF3-N45C].
9 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.4 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020).
10 See generally Lawrence J. Fox, Accountants, the Hawks of the Professional World: They Foul
Our Nest and Theirs Too, Plus Other Ruminations on the Issue of MDP, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1097 (2000)
[hereinafter Fox, Hawks]; Lowell J. Noteboom, Professions in Convergence: Taking the Next Step, 84
MINN. L. REV. 1359 (2000); Daniel R. Fischel, Multidisciplinary Practice, 55 Bus. LAW. 951, 952
(2000); Elijah D. Farrell, Accounting Firms and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Who Is the Bar
Really Trying to Protect?, 33 IND. L. REV. 599,600 (2000); Elizabeth MacDonald, Accounting Firms
Hire Lawyers and Other Attorneys Cry Foul, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1997, at B8.
11 See Bruch, supra note 7.
12 Legal Executive Institute, How Big Is the U.S. Legal Services Market?, THOMPSON REUTERS
(Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.legalexecutiveinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/How-Big-is-
the-US-Legal-Services-Market.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4SR-CMAM].




innovative methods of legal services delivery in the corporate and small
firm contexts, detailing changes from the traditional law firm model and
showing how such methods address market demands.14
Grounded in historical conceptions about the unique and elevated
role of lawyers,15 resistance to change and an inability to accept new
methods of providing legal services has forced an enterprising generation
of lawyers to operate outside of the technical ethical rules in order to stay
afloat with market demands and the rising global tide. 16 The ethical rules
restrict the development of these legal entrepreneurs in their quest to
remain competitive, to determine their own professional identities and
steer the legal profession, and to collaborate with other professions to
better meet the holistic needs of their clients. This Article first argues that
we should amend the ethical rules, in particular model Rule 5.4, to
recognize and regulate fee-sharing and co-ownership of law firms
between lawyers and non-lawyers because of the impact of PwC and
Deloitte's competitive advantage in "striking first," as viewed through the
lens of "first-to-market" theories. 17Despite these advantages, the legal
profession can leverage its current regulatory monopoly to offer a higher
quality, competitive offering to collaborative legal services market. This
Article then argues that we should amend our ethical rules to allow
lawyers to associate and collaborate with non-lawyer professionals,
focusing on restricting law firm structural forms that may improperly
14 See Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of Purchasing Legal
Services from Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary Partnership, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 217 (2000); John
Dzienkowski, The Future of Big Law: Alternative Legal Service Providers to Corporate Clients, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 2995 (2014); 2016 ABA REPORT, supra note 13; Stacy L. Brustin, Legal Services
Provision Through Multidisciplinary Practice-Encouraging Holistic Advocacy While Protecting
Ethical Interests, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 787, 819-20 (2002).
15 See generally Anthony Ogus, Rethinking Self-Regulation, 15 Ox. J. LEGAL STUD. 97 (1995);
Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of Professional
Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1696 (2008) [hereinafter Hadfield,
Legal Barriers]; Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the
Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 983 (2000) [hereinafter Hadfield, Price of Law].
16 Since 1998, law office employment shrunk while "all other legal services" grew 8.5% annually
and 140% over the whole period. THE ABA COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVICES, ISSUE
PAPER CONCERNING UNREGULATED LSP ENTITIES 3-4 (2016), https://www.americanbar.org/
contentldam/aba/images/office president/final unregulated lsp entities issues paper.pdf
[perma.cc/NV52-CHEM].
17 See Marvin B. Lieberman & David B. Montgomery, First-Mover Advantages, 9 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 41 (1988).
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subvert the independent judgment of a lawyer and promoting and
marketing lawyer majority owned and controlled law firms.
Two underlying weaknesses in our legal profession's "integrity
system,"18 however, currently restrict such a revision-the self-regulated
market monopoly that lawyers enjoy over legal services and the
regulatory conflation imbedded in our ethical rules that bind all
lawyering acts under a "single profession of law." 19 The broad reach of the
monopoly that lawyers enjoy over the practice of law feeds protectionism,
however, and creates a highly restrictive environment in which lawyers
can deliver legal services to clients in the United States.20 Gillian
Hadfield's article Legal Barriers to Innovation sets the framework for the
monopoly and regulatory conflation discussion.21 The regulatory
conflation in the ethical rules result in forcing ill-fitting regulations
designed for litigation onto the market-based, transactional work that
lawyers do. Scholars document well the chilling impact of these two
structural frameworks on innovations in legal services delivery. 22
The window through which to view the impacts of these larger
systemic issues is Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 5.4,
"Professional Independence of a Lawyer."23 Rule 5.4 currently restricts
how a lawyer may provide legal or law related services in four ways.24
First, it prohibits fee sharing between lawyers and nonlawyers, except in
certain circumstances.25 Second, it prohibits a lawyer from forming a
18 ANDREW ALEXANDRA & SEUMAS MILLER, INTEGRITY SYSTEMS FOR OCCUPATIONS (2010).
19 ABA CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, RESOLUTION OF HOUSE OF DELEGATES ADOPTING
REVISED RECOMMENDATION 10F (2002); see also Hadfield, Legal Barriers, supra note 15, at 1692;
Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Infrastructure and the New Economy, 8 J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 1
(2012); Dzienkowski, supra note 14, at 2996; Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly:
A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1,
6 (1981); George Steven Swan, The Political Economy of Interprofessional Imperialism: The Bar and
Multidisciplinary Practice, 1999-2001, 24 J. LEGAL PROF. 151 (2000).
20 Hadfield, Legal Barriers, supra note 15, at 1694.
21 Id. at 1696, 1704. The ABA expanded its list of "core values" in 2000 to include
"maintain[ing] a single profession of law." ABA CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, RESOLUTION OF
HOUSE OF DELEGATES ADOPTING REVISED RECOMMENDATION 10F (2002).
22 See 2016 ABA REPORT, supra note 13, at 39.
23 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.4 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020).
24 Id.
25 Id. r. 5.4(a); Laurel S. Terry, A Primer on MDPs: Should the "No"Rule Become a New Rule?,
72 TEMP. L. REV. 869, 873 (1999) [hereinafter Terry, Primer].
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partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership
consist of the practice of law.26 Third, it prohibits nonlawyers from
directing or regulating the lawyer's professional independent judgment.27
Fourth, it prohibits lawyers from practicing law if any nonlawyer owns or
is an officer of the law firm.28 These restrictions essentially require that
only lawyers can provide legal services, become a partner in or own firms
that provide legal services, direct or control the delivery of legal services,
and profit from the delivery of legal services.
The practical impact of Rule 5.4 can harm lawyers and the clients
they serve. This hardline stance against potential nonlawyer ownership of
law firms trickles down to hindering potential collaborations between
lawyers and nonlawyers who respond to client concerns that impact
efficient delivery of services to vulnerable and low-income populations.
In these types of community-focused collaborations, where fears about
Enron-type scandals and potential hostile takeovers of law firms by
accounting firms are virtually non-existent,29 Rule 5.4's purpose simply
does not fit. 30
Since the 1980s when MDPs first emerged internationally, strong
support for and against MDPs were on both sides of the legal bar.31 Those
against MDPs, and whose arguments eventually influenced the ABA
Model Rule 5.4 that we have today, stand behind the need to protect the
"core values" of the profession and conclude that the need to preserve
lawyer independence, maintain loyalty, and protect confidentiality take
precedent over rules that, while allowing for innovative methods of
financing and managing legal services, could implicate these
"shibboleths" of the legal profession.32 But these arguments ring hollow
with each passing decade, and now the Philistines are at our gates.33
26 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020).
27 Id. r. 5.4(c).
28 Id. r. 5.4(d).
29 See Kathryn Lolita Yarbrough, Multidisciplinary Practices: Are They Already Among Us?, 53
ALA. L. REv. 639, 641 (2002) (after the Great Depression, the main individuals charged with
unauthorized practice of law were accountants).
30 See Susan Poser, Main Street Multidisciplinary Practice Firms: Laboratories for the Future, 37
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 95,98 (2003).
31 See Terry, Primer, supra note 25, at 875.
32 Hadfield, Legal Barriers, supra note 15, at 1715.
33 See Lawrence J. Fox, The Argument Against Change, 9 EXPERIENCE 5, 8 (1999).
2290 [Vol. 41:2283
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Legal scholars support the recognition and regulation of MDPs in
order to better address client needs and to keep lawyers both satisfied and
competitive in a changing market-based economy.34 This Article joins in
the debate by supporting the recognition and regulation of MDPs because
the legal profession must keep pace with global accounting firms. Also,
the Bar's continued outlaw of MDPs has not stopped their development,
but only hindered their efficiency and client-centeredness, forcing
innovative lawyers to operate within ill-structured and restrictive rules.
These lawyers operate for the benefit of their clients and professional
well-being at the risk of censure and punishment by state bar associations
and ethics boards, labeled as shamefully or bravely engaging in "civil
disobedience,"35 depending on the speaker's viewpoint.36 As the ABA's
own 2016 Commission on the Future of Legal Services encourages, the
legal profession should encourage the continued innovation in legal
services delivery, including potentially regulating different types of legal
services entities.37
This Article first provides a novel classification scheme that
approaches and defines MDPs as either authorized, gray, or black market
law firms, classifying the MDPs according to their level of non-lawyer
ownership or control over the MDP. Using that classification scheme, this
Article ultimately argues that MDP regulation should be broad and non-
proscriptive, allowing lawyers to utilize their creativity and innovation to
34 See Daly, supra note 14; Louise Lark Hill, The Preclusion of Nonlawyer Ownership of Law
Firms: Protecting the Interest of Clients or Protecting the Interest ofLawyers?, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 907
(2014); Michael W. Price, A New Millenniums Resolution: The ABA Continues Its Regrettable Ban
on Multidisciplinary Practice, 37 Hous. L. REV. 1495, 1496 (2000); Gary A. Munneke, Dances with
Nonlawyers: A New Perspective on Law Firm Diversification, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 559, 564 (1992);
see also, e.g., Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice ofLaw: Do Good Fences Really Make
Good Neighbors-or Even Good Sense?, 5 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 159,159-60 (1980).
35 PA. BAR Ass'N COMM'N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE & RELATED TRENDS AFFECTING
THE PROFESSION, PRELIMINARY REPORT TO 1999 MID-YEAR MEETING OF PBA HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 4 (1999); Robert K. Christensen, At the Helm of the Multidisciplinary Practice Issue
After the ABA's Recommendation, 2001 BYU L. REV. 375, 389 [hereinafter Christensen, At the
Helm]; John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and the American Legal
Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in the Twenty-First
Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83,149 (2000).
36 See Lawrence J. Fox, Delegates: Save Us from Ourselves, NAT'L L.J., July 21, 1999, at A23. But
see Robert M. Palumbos, Within Each Lawyer's Conscience a Touchstone: Law, Morality, and
Attorney Civil Disobedience, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1057, 1065 (2005); Terry, Primer, supra note 25, at
930.
37 2016 ABA REPORT, supra note 13, at 49.
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association with nonlawyer professional in any number of potential
organization forms, but should prohibit and restrict MDPs that would fall
into the "black market" category.
Part I of this Article discusses the historical and present regulatory
rules which govern the delivery of legal services in the United States,
detailing how the legal profession's integrity system has created a
monopoly over the delivery of legal and law related services. This
monopoly, coupled with rhetoric about the legal profession's duty to
preserve the "core values" of the profession, impairs the development of
innovative methods in the delivery of legal services that stunt and put
lawyers at a disadvantage against other professionals. Part I then
delineates the impact of our self-regulatory scheme on how we regulated
both political/democratic legal acts and economic/market driven legal
acts. While considered separate practices in other countries, the United
States conflates the two spheres and regulates all lawyering acts under the
umbrella of a "unified profession of law." Part I then provides an overview
of new innovations in legal services that respond to both corporate and
low-income client needs, concluding with a call for the continued need
for empirical research and innovation in both spheres.
Part II introduces a prime example of these systemic failures-
multidisciplinary providers or "MDPs"-and explains the different forms
of organizations considered MDPs. Part II then explores the global
impact of MDPs, the recent history of the current form of ABA Model
Rule 5.4, and its impact on the development of MDPs during the early
2000s, discussing state and practitioner responses. Part II then discusses
the current status of MDP authorization and the D.C.'s revised Rule 5.4.
Part II then summarizes the current arguments for and against MDP
recognition. Part II concludes by calling for recognition and regulation of
MDPs, as the need to stay globally competitive and embrace innovation
becomes renewed. This Part argues that PwC and Deloitte, as "first
movers," have already gained a competitive market advantage that
lawyers, later to enter the national MDP market, will need to overcome,
but argues that lawyers can leverage their current licensure monopoly to
market a higher quality and more ethical MDP product.
Part III discusses the different frameworks and approaches to
regulating MDPs and introduces a new classification scheme to both
categorize certain types of MDPs as well as create a regulatory scheme
focused on those classifications. This Articles focuses most attention on
2292 [Vol. 41:2283
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fully integrated MDPs and zeros in the real issue at stake-the role or
percentage of ownership or management do the non-lawyer
professionals. This classification scheme separates MDPs into white, gray,
or black market law firms. Part III then uses those distinctions to argue
that our regulatory scheme should regulate for the risks inherent in gray
and black market law firms. Part III then proposes MDP regulation that
is generally non-proscriptive, but regulates more specifically for risks
inherent in gray and black market law firms. Finally, Part III concludes
with a discussion of some potential counterarguments.
I. THE LEGAL PROFESSION'S INTEGRITY SYSTEM FAILURES
If you destroy a free market you create a black market.
-Winston Churchil38
Lawyers belong to a profession. One distinguishing feature across all
professional occupations is the high level of autonomy professionals
enjoy in how they deliver their professional services to clients.39 In order
to protect client and public interests against the potential for systemic,
abusive rent-seeking behavior, a profession's "integrity system" seeks to
imbue the profession with ethical and business norms meant o protect
the interests of clients and the public at large.40 The method of
establishing such an integrity system can also have the effect of regulating
the market economies and limiting the economic potential for the
individuals subjected to the system.41
The legal profession's integrity system is not without its flaws. In an
attempt to protect the "core values" of the legal profession, the regulatory
framework of the legal profession has two limiting features that have
contributed to the current competitive disadvantage lawyers find
themselves in today. These two features are weaknesses in the economic
structure of legal services and of the approach of the regulatory code of
ethics governing the legal profession. Simply put, our regulatory rules
38 460 Parl Deb HC (4th ser.) (1949) col. 1862 (UK).
39 ALEXANDRA & MILLER, supra note 18, at 20.
4U Id. at 23-24.
41 Ogus, supra note 15, at 108.
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have created a market monopoly over the delivery of legal services and
our regulatory codes of ethics improperly frame all legal services acts
under a unitary vision of the practice of law.42
The failures of the legal profession's integrity system have particular
impact on the provision of legal services focusing on contributing to
economic and business transactions, namely, lawyers who counsel
organizational clients and engage in transactional and counseling work.
This Section will discuss how these two structural failures have forced
such legal entrepreneurs to operate at an innovative disadvantage, as such
lawyers must temper their creativity, market-responsiveness, or client-
efficiencies or risk operating outside the strict operating and regulatory
framework sanctioned by the legal bar.
Despite these restrictions, innovative forms of legal services delivery
have emerged over the past few decades. While most of the debate centers
around legal service providers who serve organizational and corporate
clients,43 small law firms play a vital role in developing innovative and
efficient legal services delivery systems in an attempt to better serve their
low- and middle-income clients. These small firms present a unique
opportunity to balance the normative considerations in developing
innovation in the context of responding to client needs.44 However, as
scholars and regulators alike note, more empirical research is needed to
determine the scope and types of innovative legal services models in
existence, and more innovation is needed to improve access to and
efficiencies in providing professional legal services.
A. The Legal Market Monopoly
The legal profession is one of the few that enjoys self-regulation. The
justification for lawyer self-regulation in the United States has roots in
colonial times, when lawyers enjoyed an elevated status of "lawyer-
statesman."45 Because of this specialized status, the only persons viewed
42 Hadfield, Legal Barriers, supra note 15, at 1696, 1706.
43 Poser, supra note 30, at 96.
44 See Louise G. Trubek & Jennifer Farnham, Social Justice Collaboratives: Multidisciplinary
Practices for People, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 227,228-29 (2000).
45 Hadfield, Legal Barriers, supra note 15, at 1696; Ogus, supra note 15, at 97-108 (overview of
the economic analysis of self-regulation).
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apt to oversee such a learned and noble profession were those in the
profession themselves. This specialized system of lawyer self-regulation
continues to affect the front end and back end of attorney regulation
today-lawyers proscribe both their own rules of ethical play as well as
their own systems of lawyer discipline.46 This system, built around the
"medieval guild" conception of the legal profession,47 has created a highly
restrictive monopoly through which a client can receive professional egal
assistance.
1. Self-Regulation
a. History and Justification
The concept of the legal profession's self-governance is acceptable
on the premise that the law and its protection are so specialized that
"relative expertise and hence enhanced capacity to achieve the public
interest by those who are themselves members of the profession" is
necessary.48 In some respects, this justification has merit. Complex legal
issues often require the weighing of "not only intellectual subtlety of legal
rules[,] but also the mass of factors and contingencies which must or
could be considered in determining legal strategies."49 Subject matter
complexity alone, however, does fully justify this regulatory deferment.
Lawyers claim a specialized status in the United States. In an oft-
quoted saying from the second annual ABA meeting held in 1879, the
American legal profession, unlike the "titmouse" of England, upholds the
institution of democracy itself. 50 Guided by a duty to protect the ideals of
46 See Benjamin J. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal Profession?,
59 ALA. L. REv. 453, 461 (2008) [hereinafter Barton, Judges Systemically Favor].
41 See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM &JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 3 (2000) ("[T]he ways
of lawyers ... suggest the esoteric flimflam of a jealous guild."); ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 165-226 (1902); see also Dzienkowski, supra note 14, at 2996.
48 Barton, Judges Systemically Favor, supra note 46, at 461-62; Hadfield, Legal Barriers, supra
note 15, at 1696 (citing Ogus, supra note 15, at 97-108); Susan R. Martyn, Lawyer Competence and
Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69 GEO. L.J. 705,707 (1981); Nancy J. Moore, The Usefulness of
Ethical Codes, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 7, 14-16.
49 Hadfield, Price of Law, supra note 15, at 965.
50 Edward J. Phelps, Annual Address, in REPORT OF THE SECOND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASS'N 188 (1879) ("Your mere nisi prius lawyer knows no more of the principles
that control the affairs of state, than a titmouse knows of the gestation of an elephant.").
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the constitution, which were re-affirmed by the horrors of the Civil
War,51 lawyers in the United States were able to not only establish their
authority to self-govern and self-regulate, but to also impose proscriptive
rules for attorney ethical behavior and internal disciplinary procedures
for attorney misconduct.
The actual limits of self-governance are somewhat unclear.52 For the
most part, with the exception of federal regulations enacted in response
to the financial crisis of 2008, Congress has remained silent on the issue
of lawyer regulation, leaving most rules to the state courts and
legislatures.53 The ABA, however, since its inception in 1878, has "woven
a powerful, but perhaps untested, claim to a fundamental authority over
the regulation of the entire legal system."54 Since its founding, the ABA
has sought to regulate not only substantive areas of law and legal practice,
but also issues of legal reform, judicial administration, legal education
and admission to the bar, and grievances.55
The Preamble to the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct
codify the legal profession's ability to self-regulate.6 These paragraphs
focus on the unique nature of lawyer self-regulation among other self-
regulating professions and the use of courts to enforce that self-
regulation,57 how self-regulation protects the profession's independence
from "government domination,"8 the responsibility of lawyers to abide
by the rules,59 and the role of lawyers in preserving society.60 The
51 Id. at 191; see also Robert W. Gordon, Portrait of a Profession in Paralysis, 54 STAN. L. REV.
1427, 1440 (2002).
52 See Daly, supra note 14, at 277.
53 See William H. Simon, Introduction: The Post-Enron Identity Crisis of the Business Lawyer,
74 FORDHAM L. REv. 947,950 (2005).
54 Hadfield, Legal Barriers, supra note 15, at 1696.
55 Id. at 1698.
56 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT: PREAMBLE & SCOPE, paras. 10-13 (AM. BAR ASS'N
2020).
S7 Id. para. 10. See generally Thomas M. Alpert, The Inherent Power of the Courts to Regulate
the Practice of Law: An Historical Analysis, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 525, 533 (1983); Barton, Judges
Systematically Favor, supra note 48, at 461-63. But cf Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of
the Legalization of American Legal Ethics-I the Modern Era, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 212
(2002).
58 MODELRULESOF PROF'L CONDUCT: PREAMBLE &SCOPE, paras. 10-13 (AM. BARASS'N2020).
59 Id. para. 12.
6U Id. para. 13.
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Preamble thus enshrines as four of the thirteen motivations for upholding
the ethical rules recitals that instruct lawyers to perpetuate their own self-
regulation.61
b. Effects
One effect of self-regulation, which is also not unique to the legal
profession's integrity system among professionals, is the potential for
self-regulation to be used as a means of self-preservation, more often
implicitly, but sometimes explicitly stated by the profession. For lawyers,
the self-regulation results in the potential for and now-realized expansive
professional monopoly over the delivery of legal services in the United
States. This monopoly impacts entry into this specialized professional
ecosystem and can have the opposite effect of the "core values"
intention-namely, creating greater client inefficiencies and reduced
holistic professional services.
The purpose of defining the practice of law is to delineate who can
engage in it.62 The United States limits those who can provide legal
services through the feature of professional licensure. As explained by
Hadfield, "If a product or service provides an input that falls within the
'practice of law' then, with few exceptions, only lawyers may be suppliers
in that market."63 In short, only lawyers can practice law. This further
means that only those individuals who (for the most part) attend law
school at an ABA accredited institution and who pass the bar in a
particular state or jurisdiction are authorized to practice law.64
The monopoly that lawyers enjoy over the practice of law is both a
vertical one and a horizontal one. It is a vertical monopoly in that
licensure creates a hierarchy among professionals involved in providing
legal services to clients. Only attorneys may provide legal advice or sign
pleadings.65 The licensure monopoly is also a horizontal one in that it
excludes other professionals, such as accountants and business
61 See generally Barton, Judges Systematically Favor, supra note 48, at 461.
62 Hadfield, Legal Barriers, supra note 15, at 1709.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 1712.
65 See generally Allan M. Tow & Susan P. Gaskell, Observations on Multidisciplinary Practice,
19 J. PARALEGAL EDUC. & PRAC. 53, 54 (2003).
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consultants, from practicing law or delivering legal services.66
Considering the far reaching nature of the effect of the law on almost
every ordinary transaction,67 the licensure wall is key to upholding the
breadth of the horizontal monopoly that lawyers enjoy over the entirety
of the legal services market in the United States.
2. Self-Regulatory Competition + Risk-Based and Outcomes-Based
Regulation
This legal services market monopoly directly impacts the quality of
legal services provided to clients. As Anthony Ogus discusses in
Rethinking Self-Regulation, self-regulation allows those who are impacted
by the regulation to potentially benefit from rules designed to reinforce
their control and to allow those impacted to engage in rent-seeking
behavior at the expense of their consumers.68 Empirical evidence
demonstrates that with the self-regulatory power to issue licenses to enter
a profession, those with that power have used it to limit entry into the
field, causing those current professionals operating in the space to earn
"supra-competitive profits."69 By monopolizing the provision of legal
services, lawyers can and historically have been able to charge a premium
for their legal expertise because of the lack of available competitive
alternatives. 70
In an unrestrained competitive free market, providers compete with
one another on quality and price. 71 While providers of goods and services
may face quality standards imposed by regulatory agencies, quality
determinations are shaped by a number of internal and external forces
which impact managerial decision-making as to quality.72 Such internal
and external forces can include consumer demand, competitive
alternatives, and the provider's own imposed standards based on
66 Hadfield, Legal Barriers, supra note 15, at 1713.
67 Id. at 1708.
68 Ogus, supra note 15, at 99.
69 Id.
7U Id.
71 Id. at 103.
72 Id.
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company quality requirements and ethically focused initiatives.73 Directly
tied to the level and type of quality offered to consumers is the price point
at which a provider can offer a good or service, which is also the result of
a balancing of a multitude of factors-one of which is the price point at
which a competitor can provide a product of similar quality. 74 Because of
open market competition, Ogus explains, competitive providers can
introduce into the market products which match consumers' differing
needs across a spectrum of cost-quality combinations. 75
Competition thus incentivizes providers to innovate in achieving
quality standards at price points at which their customers will purchase
the good or service. If restraints on the market exist that eliminate
competition and favor a single provider, then the provider has less
incentive to control quality or costs. This can result in diminished
efficiencies, in rent-seeking behavior by the now-only provider, fewer
options for consumers, and stagnation in innovation and development.76
In the context of providing legal services, however, opening up
competition to other professions or to unlicensed legal professionals
without regulatory oversight could potentially run afoul of Ogus's two
main critiques of open-market competition: when cost and quality
competition has adverse impacts on the public at large, and when the
nature of the good or service provided is so specialized that it becomes
difficult for the consumer to measure or compare the quality of services
received.77 In the context of providing legal services, lowered quality
standards in order to compete for prices could adversely impact the
stability of public and private institutions and transactions which rely on
the legal profession's providing consistent, high quality legal work.
Second, legal services are credence goods, meaning that consumers are
not in a position to measure the quality of the service they received.78
Further, while many corporate clients will have developed the required
sophistication level needed to demand competitive prices from their
73 Id. at 103.
74 Id. at 103.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 102-05.
77 Id. at 105.




lawyers due to experiences with legal services over time, the lay person
legal consumer, who may only need the services of an attorney once or
twice in her life for transactions which she will only encounter once, must
rely on mere price, reputation, or other external factors to measure her
satisfaction with her attorney.
Anticipating these weaknesses in unrestrained open-market
competition, especially as applied to the professions, Ogus theorizes that
open-market competition could work with independent agency assisted
competition.79 Under this model, Ogus discusses the attributes of either
using an outside agency to set and maintain minimum standards that
competing providers must meet or having all competing providers
submit their services for approval or accreditation to the existing self-
regulated authority. With the first example, a third party regulator would
create a set of standards which would govern all persons providing a
particular legal service.80 With the second possibility, all legal service
providers would seek approval and accreditation from the current
regulatory authorities to engage in certain practices on behalf of clients.81
In this latter instance, Ogus suggests that still some third party agent
would need to review the regulatory authority's approval process to
ensure fairness and quality control.82
Another possibility would be the creation of not only competition
among service providers, but competition for regulatory approval, what
Ogus calls "competitive self-regulation."3 He provides an example of
how this would operate within a legal system by describing the purpose
and effect of the Courts and Legal Services Act of 1990 on the solicitors
and barristers in England and Wales. Both principal legal professions
enjoy self-regulation under differing regulatory regimes and both had,
prior to the Act, monopoly rights over certain legal acts.84 The Act
authorized "bodies" who represented other professions or practitioners
to apply for certain rights previously unavailable to them. A potential
consumer would then have the option to choose between a barrister,
79 Ogus, supra note 15, at 103-04.
80 Id. at 105.
81 Id. at 105.
82 Id. at 103-04
83 Id. at 102-03.
84 Id. at 105-06.
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solicitor, or a different profession entirely altogether for certain legal
services, each potential professional regulated by their own self-
regulatory system. In this system, approval by competing regulatory
systems and professions will signal different standards to consumers.85
Competition among regulatory authorities will then incentivize
regulators to adapt to market demands and regulate with an eye toward
encouraging competition and innovation.86
A third-party regulatory agency would then need to maintain
minimum standards, or the professions would need to agree to certain
minimum standards for certain legal acts. Ogus further discusses how the
1990 Act requires the different self-regulatory agencies to submit their
regulatory proposals to independent, public agencies, creating a "second
tier of regulation" focused on protecting consumers from malpractice
and maintaining minimum practice standards.87 With regulation de-
centralized, additional externalities and internalities will dictate the level
of services,88 and the regulatory agencies and third party independent
reviewer can focus instead on regulating for risks and regulating for client
and professional outcomes. 89
In certain legal contexts, this self-regulatory competition between
professions already exists. The federal government specifically allows
some professionals, namely accountants, to represent clients in certain
tax-related matters. "Circular 230," published by the Treasury
Department, authorizes certain classes of persons to practice before the
Internal Revenue Service: attorneys, certified public accountants,
enrolled agents, enrolled actuaries, and "others."90 In the Tax Court Rules
ofPractice and Procedure, Rule 200 makes a distinction between attorneys
who practice in tax court and "other applicants."91 The Supreme Court
clarified that federal authorization for a specific agency does not
authorize the general practice of that area of law, "but sanctions only the
85 Id. at 105-06.
86 See id. at 99, 104-05. One example of a third-party regulatory agency is the creation of B-
Lab.
87 Id. at 105-06.
88 See Julian Webb, Regulating Lawyers in a Liberalized Legal Services Market: The Role of
Education and Training, 24 STAN. L. &POL'Y REv. 533, 550 (2013).
89 Id.
9o 31 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2019).
91 Daly, supra note 14, at 254; TAX CT. R. 200(a) (2).
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performance of those services which are reasonably necessary and
incident" to the representation before the agency.92 Thus, potential clients
who may need representation before the IRS on certain delineated
matters can choose between a lawyer, an accountant, or an "other," each
of which is regulated by its own self-regulatory system but which all
submit to the public authority and regulation of Congress and the IRS.
B. Regulatory Conflation
Compounding the restrictiveness of the legal services monopoly, the
ethical rules controlling lawyer behavior improperly conflate all of the
different legal practice areas available to practicing lawyers, regulating all
lawyers under a unified set of rules. The underlying theoretical grounding
for this conflation-that there is a single, unified profession of law-is
unique to the United States and common law countries.93 Where civil law
counterparts divide the profession into as many as eight different
functions, which differ in terms of education, training, and regulations,94
the United States continues to adhere to a conception of a singular legal
profession and regulate different practice areas collectively. The very
foundational perspective of our ethical codes creates a limited operational
playing field that improperly restricts certain legal practice acts.
As Hadfield discusses, at a base level, the profession of law can be
divided into two distinct tasks, the democratic/political and
economic/market-based.95 Within the democratic sphere, lawyers use
their positions to secure and defend rights and obligations on behalf of
clients in litigation and before administrative agencies. Within the
economic sphere, lawyers work with clients to help them achieve market-
based outcomes based in entity counseling, transactional awyering skills,
and contract drafting. Even framed by such a crude binary, the different
personal and ethical issues at stake in the relationship between the lawyer
and her respective clients drastically diverge. While the ABA has made
some progress in regulating relationships to organizational and business
92 Sperryv. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 386 (1963).
93 Daly, supra note 14, at 227.
94 See infra Section LB.
95 Hadfield, Legal Barriers, supra note 15, at 1701-02.
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clients, as opposed to individual clients, scholars point out the continued
shortcomings of the ethical rules as applied to the full panoply of services
modern lawyers provide to those different types of clients.96
1. Unified Profession of Law
a. United States
Before the explosion of the corporate form, the demarcation
between the promotion of individual rights and the law that controlled
market transactions was not as definitive as it is today.97 Toward the end
of the 1800s, most businesses were personal or family owned, where
"owners managed and managers owned."98 It was easy to conceptualize
lawyers providing holistic representation to these family-owned
businesses as merging the best interests of the business with the
individual constituents involved.99 Because of the close nature between
an owner's interests and a business's, judges began applying the legal
rights traditionally associated with individual rights to corporate
interests. 100 In 1905, the United States Supreme Court decided Lochner v.
New York, which judicially expanded the concept of substantive due
process and created economic substantive due process.101 The Lochner
case solidified the jurisprudential basis for the recognition of
corporations as "persons" with constitutional and actionable rights. 102
The role of a lawyer in providing counsel to such a client balanced
the lawyer's obligations to advise the managers in a way that also
protected larger affected constituents and societal impacts.103 Lawyers
acted as a "curb" on the "excesses of capitalism" in addition to providing
96 Id. at 1702.
97 Id. at 1702; WILLIAM G. Roy, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL: THE RISE OF THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION IN AMERICA 4 (1997); ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE
MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 9 (1977).
98 Hadfield, Legal Barriers, supra note 15, at 1702.
99 See id. at 1703.
loo Id. at 1702 03.
l0l Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
12 Hadfield, Legal Barriers, supra note 15, at 1703 & n.62.
103 Id. at 115-16.
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operational and economic advice to their clients. 104 The original 1908
Canons of Professional Ethics includes three quotes in its final report,
meant to direct the overarching goals and purpose of the Canons.105 The
third quote by Abraham Lincoln echoes this commitment to public
welfare in the discharge of a lawyer's duties to clients.106 Hadfield also
recounts the 1902 story of Brandeis counseling the owner of a shoe
company to respond to both the owner's profit concerns and the
employees' wage concerns.107 This function of the lawyer merged the
"corporation lawyer" with the "people's lawyer." 108
After World War I, however, with the growth of modern, publicly
traded corporations in which ownership and management became
occupied by distinct groups, the role of an attorney in advising
corporations shifted.109 The imposition of corporate management iers
and the contractual nature of managerial positions splintered the
business from its constituents.110 Courts backed away from Lochner and
no longer "merge[d] questions of economic policy with questions of
constitutional rights."lll Despite the constitutional analytical framework
shifting away from recognizing corporate constitutional rights and its re-
emergence in recent years with decision such as Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,
which recognized that corporations can have First Amendment
protections for genuinely held religious beliefs,112 the Bar still
conceptualizes the services that attorneys provide to individuals in
litigation as equivalent to those provided to business transactional
clients.113
104 Louis D. BRANDEIS, BUSINESS-A PROFESSION 313, 323 (1914).
105 "The Canons of Ethics for Lawyers Adopted by the American Bar Association," 101 THE
ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. AND SOC. SCI. 254 (1922) [hereinafter "The Canons"].
M6 See Final Report of the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, 33 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 567,
574 (1908).
07 See Hadfield, Legal Barriers, supra note 15, at 1703; see also David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige
Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 717, 722-23 (1988).
108 BRANDEIS, supra note 104, at 321.
109 Hadfield, Legal Barriers, supra note 15, at 1703-04.
110 Id. at 116.
i Id. at 1704.
12 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 16-49 (2014).
113 Hadfield, Legal Barriers, supra note 15, at 118.
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b. Civil Law Countries
The breadth of the continued unification of the legal profession
becomes even more pronounced when compared to the hierarchical and
horizontal landscape of the legal service providers in civil law systems. In
France, what the United States would consider the practice of law
reserved for lawyers, is actually performed by eight different and distinct
professions. 114 In most European countries, scholars generally divide the
legal services profession into "public prosecutor, judge, notary, or lawyer
with the 'right of audience."'115 In France, only a lawyer with a right of
audience or a notary needs a specialized license.116 In Russia,
comparatively, only those litigators appearing in criminal cases need a
special licensure.117 For all other duties the United States typically
associates as lawyer's work, any person can perform on behalf of
another. 118
2. Democratic and Economic Functions of Law and Quasi-Legal Roles
At its simplest, scholars divide the work lawyers do into two sectors:
the democratic/political sphere and the economic/market-driven
sphere.119 This distinction anchors the democratic sphere to the
continuing tradition of the role of lawyers as the defenders of individual
rights and of the Constitution.120 Examples of such services include:
"protecting the architecture of democratic institutions, protecting
individual rights, implementing the balance of power that promotes the
normative goals of self-governance such as human dignity, autonomy,
fairness, and well-being."121 The second sphere, economic/market-
114 Olivier d'Ormesson, French Perspectives on the Duty of Loyalty: Comparisons with the
American View, in RIGHTS, LIABILITY, AND ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICES 29 (Mary
C. Daly & Roger J. Goebel eds., 1995).
115 Daly, supra note 14, at 228.
116 Id. at 229.
17 Julie Mamou, How to Practise in Russia, L. Soc'Y (Sept. 19, 2014, 12:17 PM),
[https://perma.cc/BU83-BFHC].
118 Id.
119 Hadfield, LegalBarriers, supra note 15, at 1702.
12U See generally id. at 1701-05.
121 Id. at 1702.
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driven, refers to the role of legal services in providing "efficient market
transactions," which include: "establishing real and intellectual property
rights, and facilitating contractual and organizational economic
relationships in finance, innovation .... and trade." 122 Alternatively, such
spheres occupy litigation versus transactional work.
These two spheres differ by the goals of the representation and by
the larger implications and stakes involved. The regulation of contracts
that will "increase the liquidity of financial markets[] or promote
collaborative investment in innovation" differ from those involved in
"ensuring that police searches are in compliance with the Fourth
Amendment, hiring is accomplished in a nondiscriminatory manner, and
products are safely designed and produced."123 In short, democratic
lawyering centers around protecting individual rights in the context of
disputes or through the vehicle of judicial processes; economic lawyering
focuses on facilitating deals and assisting clients to navigate the legal
implications of their market transactions.
Because of those different goals and orientations, the overall
framework and methodology of the work that lawyers do for clients in the
democratic sphere also differ from the work that lawyers do for clients in
furtherance of market and economic transactions. 124 Lawyers who litigate
resolve disputes, while lawyers who engage in transactional work
facilitate deals. 125 Litigators engage in remedial lawyering; transactional
attorneys engage in preventative lawyering. 126 Litigators present disputed
facts in a light most favorable to their client's legal position; therefore, the
perspective of litigation is by necessity backwards looking. 127 In contrast,
the perspective of dealing-making is forward looking, where lawyers
assist clients to achieve certain transactions by adding value through their
familiarity with the legal rules affecting their clients. 128
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 See ALICIA ALVAREZ & PAUL TREMBLAY, INTRODUCTION TO TRANSACTIONAL LAWYERING 3
(2013).
125 Id. at 4.
126 Id. at 5.
127 Id. at 3.
128 Id.
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With these differences in the role of a lawyer impacting the
orientation and goals of the relationship, different ethical risks also exist
in the relationship between lawyers and clients they are representing in
the context of litigation versus in the context of deal-making.129 In the
context of litigation, the adversarial positioning requires the utmost
observance of and adherence to the lawyer's ethical obligations to
maintain client confidentiality,130 avoid current conflicts of interest and
properly address past client conflicts,131 and to zealously and competently
advocate on behalf of their clients and deftly navigate the legal processes
involved to protect their client's legal and personal rights. 132 One risk is
that a lawyer could engage in action that would compromise the legal
position or privacy interests of their clients, such as disclosing
confidential information that makes its way to the public or to opposing
counsel. Consider how impactful such a transgression would be when a
client's freedom is involved for lawyers engaged in criminal defense work.
If a litigator failed to zealously advocate for a client's best legal position,
this could result in incorrect and unjust results, affecting not only the
lawyer's client, but setting long-term bad precedent and overall loss of
integrity in the process of case law development. 133 Indeed, in that sense,
litigators do uphold the very "fabric of democracy" by protecting the
rights of individuals and ensuring that the institutions that support our
legal rules and social governance systems operate in a just and
constitutional manner.1 34 While the breaches of ethical duties in the
transactional sphere will often result in similarly negative outcomes for
clients in individual context, the larger implications of subpar ethical and
zealous compliance within the transactional sphere can negatively impact
the vitality and reliability of global and national economies and affect
every day transactions that move value from one individual to another.
With the increase in corporate clients' reliance on lawyers to
conduct their operations, lawyers who serve corporate clients have
129 See generally id. at 231.
130 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020).
131 Id. r. 1.7.
132 See id. at PREAMBLE & SCOPE.
133 See generally Hadfield, Legal Barriers, supra note 15, at 1701-05.
134 Id. at 1697.
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developed into serving "quasi-legal roles,"135 where lawyers not only
advise organizational clients and boards of directors on legal matters
impacting their companies, but also advise on general business matters
and processing efficiencies. With these lawyers switching "in and out of
practice," the current sector encompassing strictly legal transactional
work is beginning to disintegrate even more. 136 If more individual, elite
lawyers engage in this type of quasi-legal role, then it is likely to follow
that legal firms will soon provide corporate clients both legal and non-
legal professional consulting on a larger, more organized operational
scale. The ethical rules fail to even consider the possibility that a lawyer
may use her legal expertise to the advantage of a client that the lawyer is
advising outside of the legal context and the potential risks such a role
would entail.
Considering the scope of today's delivery of legal services, regulators
could consider a distinction between the functions of law and the further
impact such disintegration between legal practice and non-legal
professional practice will have.137 Because of the different stakes and
values involved, the ethical rules should adapt to regulate for risks
involved in each context and to legislate and systematize to promote
desired outcomes in both litigation and transactional work. While it is
more true in recent years with the increase in use of corporate social
responsibility initiatives and the growth of social enterprises that lawyers
will likely see a return to their role of advising their corporate clients
against the "excesses of capital,"138 the role of a lawyer in the
economic/market sphere should be somehow distinguished from those
who provide democratic/political legal services, in practice and
regulation and regulated according to risks and desired outcomes.139
However, the underlying foundational theory that we practice as a unified
profession of law continues to drive the framing and perspective of our
ethical rules.
135 Dana A. Remus, Out of Practice: The Twenty-First-Century Legal Profession, 63 DUKE L.J.
1243, 1245 (2014).
136 Id. at 1244.
137 See id. at 1245-46.
138 BRANDEIS, supra note 104, at 321.
139 Hadfield, Legal Barriers, supra note 15, at 1701.
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3. Impact on Codes of Ethics
The impact of the regulatory conflation of a unified profession of
law is evident in the ethical rules. The rules are built upon the underlying
foundation of uniformity lawyers, with the rules regulating relationships
between lawyers and clients, then favoring risks present in performing
litigation acts on behalf of individuals.
The original 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics say little about
representing organizational clients or engaging distinctly in market
transactions, except those that control the contractual relationship
between the lawyer and client. 140 The adoption of Model Rule 1.13 in the
1980s was the ABA's first attempt to regulate delivery of legal services to
organizational clients.141 Rule 1.13 attempts to regulate a lawyer's
relationship to an organizational client by identifying distinct reporting
and confidentiality obligations as they differ from those owed to
individual clients. Scholars, however, criticize Rule 1.13 for its sparse
commentary and its cursory and crude attempt to mirror reporting and
confidentiality obligations and loyalty duties owed to individuals on an
organizational level. 142
While amendments to the ethics codes recognize the different types
of clients for whom lawyers will serve,143 such amendments have less
vigilantly adapted to reflect the different types of work lawyers might
provide to clients. The written rules contemplate litigation contexts;
transactional applications are relegated to the comments.144 Because of
our ethical grounding in uniformity, we have piecemeal amendments for
specific lawyering acts. Our ethics codes thus mirror a tree with a thick
trunk (uniformity foundation), a complex web of branches (exceptions
and specific instances), with more coloration and leaves on certain
branches (commentary on litigation contexts) and with less coloration
and fewer leaves on other branches (commentary on transactional
contexts). This has prompted scholars to develop specialized rules in the
140 See "The Canons," supra note 105.
141 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS'N 1980).
142 See William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of
the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1453, 1464-65 (2006).
143 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS'N 1980).
144 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.3 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020).
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context of organizational clients and business transactions,145 some
arguing for a wholesale reframing of the approach of our ethics rules.146
C. Market Responses and Developments
The restrictive nature of the legal profession's market monopoly
over the delivery of legal services and the inhibiting nature of the
conflated ethical rules have not, however, deterred the development of
innovation and market-responsiveness in the delivery of legal services.
The enterprising nature, competitive drive, and public service aptitudes
of lawyers is too strong, and the desire to stay abreast with larger global
professional market trends necessitates that such legal entrepreneurs
continue to test the mettle of the restrictive regulatory rules.147 While
most of the scholarly attention focuses on innovations in law firms
serving corporate sector interests,148 many of the most impactful changes
in legal services delivery models happen in firms serving low income
communities pursuing social justice initiatives. 149 As the ABA's own 2016
Report on the Future of Legal Services provides, the legal profession
should encourage this innovation in order to meet the still unmet needs
of underrepresented clients. 150
145 See, e.g., MILTON C. REGAN, JR. & JEFFERY D. BAUMAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND CORPORATE
PRACTICE (2005); Verita Gulati, Effects ofLegal Ethics in the Business World, 17 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT 247-49 (2003); D&ret n'91-1197 du 27 novembre 1991 modifi6 organisant la profession
d'avocat [Decree 91-1197 of November 27, 1991 Organizing the Legal Profession], art. 16, 67, ss.
111, http://encyclopedie.avocats.fr/GED BWZ/197521391570/CNB-2014-06-00 aei Textes-
Profession-avocat-LG-eNG(P).pdf [https://perma.cc/77RJ-C8MA].
146 See Remus, supra note 135, at 1243-44.
147 See Paul D. Paton, Multidisciplinary Practice Redux: Globalization, Core Values, and Reviving
the MDP Debate in America, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 2193, 2205 (2010) [hereinafter Paton, MDP
Redux] (quoting Mary C. Daly, Monopolist, Aristocrat, or Entrepreneur?: A Comparative Perspective
on the Future of Multidisciplinary Partnerships in the United States, France, Germany, and the
United Kingdom After the Disintegration ofAndersen Legal, 80 WASH. U. L. Q. 589,645-46 (2002)).
148 Poser, supra note 30, at 96-97.
149 Id. at 109.
,50 2016 ABA REPORT, supra note 13, at 39.
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1. Corporate Innovations
Legal scholars have produced a plethora of studies on modern
innovations in legal services delivery. 151 This Article is not intended to
cover the breadth of that scholarship, but to discuss relevant examples of
legal services innovations to demonstrate larger trends. The majority of
recent scholarly work focuses on legal services innovations that serve
corporate clients. 152 But small firms often emulate such new practices on
a reduced or modified scale.
John Dzienkowski studies six new "big firm" models currently
serving the corporate sector and illustrates their efficiencies along five
points of inquiry. 153 The six firms, Clearspire, VLP Law Group, Axiom
Law, VistaLaw, LegalForce, and Paragon, each provide lawyers and legal
services to corporate clients. 154 Dzienkowski measures each by studying:
"(1) central features in the delivery of legal services to clients, (2) reducing
law firm overhead and costs, (3) innovation in billing practices, (4)
changes in lawyer compensation and tenure, and (5) the perspectives
from lawyers working in alternative firms." 155 As his findings show, these
new innovations "raise questions" about traditional law firm operations
in "(1) the unbundling of the client representation, (2) the training and
supervision of lawyers, (3) the training and supervision of nonlawyers,
and (4) the maintenance and presentation of documents."156 These
models also raise issues about these innovations and their impact on a
client's informed consent to potential conflicting ethical duties,
151 See, e.g., Dzienkowski, supra note 14, at 2295-97; G. Ellis Duncan, The Rise of
Multidisciplinary Practices in Europe and the Future of the Global Legal Profession Following Arthur
Andersen v. Netherlands Bar Ass'n, 9 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 537, 541-42 (2001); Lawrence J. Fox,
Old Wine in Old Bottles: Preserving Professional Independence, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 971,971-73 (1999);
Adam A. Shulenburger, Would You Like Fries with That? The Future of Multidisciplinary Practices,
87 IOWA L. REv. 327, 328-32 (2001); Susan B. Schwab, Bringing Down the Bar: Accountants
Challenge Meaning of Unauthorized Practice, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1425, 1426-32 (2000).
152 See Poser, supra note 30, at 96; Phoebe A. Haddon, The MDP Controversy: What Legal
Educators Should Know, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 504, 517 (2000) (the issue of smaller MDPs is
overshadowed by the large, professional service firm issue).
153 Dzienkowski, supra note 14, at 3002.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 3024.
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protecting client confidences, potential lawyer liability, and unauthorized
practice of law. 157
Similarly, a 2015 study identified several new categories of legal
services delivery providers: (1) secondment firms, where lawyers work on
a temporary or part-time basis in a client organization; (2) companies
combining legal advice with general business advice that is typical of
management consulting firms; (3) "accordion companies,"158 providing
networks of trained, experienced lawyers to fill short-term law firm
staffing needs; (4) virtual law practices and companies where attorneys
primarily work from home to save on overhead expenses; and (5) law
firms and companies offering tailored, specialty services with unique fee
arrangements or delivery models. 159
2. Small Firm Innovations
With notable exceptions, few scholars have addressed the impact of
innovative legal services delivery on low income and underrepresented
communities.160 Because of the continuing need and mandate in the
ABA's Model Rules preamble to increase access to legal services,161
lawyers and associations dedicated to low income and social justice
clients have recently exploded with a barrage of nontraditional legal
interventions. Many of the innovations center around the unbundling of
legal services,162 do-it-yourself or online legal services,163 community
157 Id. at 3023-36.
158 See 2016 ABA REPORT, supra note 13, at 31.
159 Id.
16u But see Poser, supra note 30, at 96; Trubek & Farnham, supra note 44, at 228.
161 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L. CONDUCT: PREAMBLE & SCOPE (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020).
162 Trubek & Farnham, supra note 44, at 228; see also Unbundling Resource Center, A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/delivery legal services/resources [https://perma.cc/X4SS-
BCR7].
163 See Trubek & Farnham, supra note 44, at 228.
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classes and workshops, 164 advice hotlines, 165 impact representation,166 law
school clinics,167 and social justice collaborations or MDPs. 168
Many small (and large) firms have used "unbundling of legal
services" to reduce costs to both the client and the lawyer. "Unbundling"
is "the practice of breaking the legal representation into separate and
distinct tasks,"169 with "an agreement between the client and the lawyer
to limit the scope of services that the lawyer renders."170 Lawyers provide
almost a checklist of potential services, such as "advice, research,
document drafting, negotiation, or court appearances,"171 from which a
client can pick and choose. The clients benefit from unbundling by
paying for individual packages of legal services, and lawyers are able to
reach a larger customer base by contracting with individuals who can
purchase a lawyer's services on such a limited and unbundled manner.
Consumers also demand improved access to "do-it-yourself'
tools. 172 The online "do-it-yourself' industry includes websites such as
LegalZoom, which offers standardized agreements and forms ranging
from organizational documents to wills. 173 This growth of self-help tools
has expanded in recent years to include mobile applications as well, which
assist both lawyers in delivering legal services and clients directly. One
app allows users to create, sign, and send legally binding contracts from a
164 See Ingrid V. Eagly, Community Education: Creating a New Version ofLegal Services Practice,
4 CLIN. L. REv. 433,454-60 (1998). Wills workshops, entrepreneurship legal start-up workshops, or
online advice for such entrepreneurs are common examples of such innovations. See, e.g., Tribal
Wills Project, STURM COLL. L., https://www.law.du.edu/academics/practical-experience/clinical-
programs/tribal-wills-project [https://perma.cc/FN5V-55VT].
165 See Legal Hotline Directory Search, EQUAL JUST. NETWORK, https://web.archive.org/web/
20100423224601/http://www.equaljustice.org/hotlinel/index.html [https://perma.cc/F35X-Y4T6].
166 Trubek & Farnham, supra note 44, at 228 (citing to tobacco and gun impact litigation).
167 See Susan R. Jones, Current Issues in the Changing Roles and Practices of Community
Economic Development Lawyers, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 437,452 (2002).
168 Trubek & Farnham, supra note 44, at 228.
169 Id.
17U Id.
1 2016 ABA REPORT, supra note 13, at 30.
172 Trubek & Farnham, supra note 44, at 228.
173 See 2016 ABA REPORT, supra note 13, at 30; LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com
[https://perma.cc/U4W9-FM58]. In 1997, the Texas Bar unsuccessfully brought an action against
Nolo Press, an online publisher of legal self-help books under its Unauthorized Practice of Law
statute. In re Nolo Press/Folk Law, Inc., 991 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 1999).
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smartphone for free. 174 These apps also operate in the democratic sphere,
such as providing tools "for immigrants, the indigent, those who face
arrest and the lawyers who help them."175 As the ABA's Report indicates,
these apps "not only give everyday people resources to solve their legal
problems-they educate people about the law and empower them. In the
end, we may end up with a more educated citizenry that can engage
meaningfully in the political process."176
3. Continued Need for Innovation and Empirical Research
While these innovations have increased access to comprehensive
and high quality legal services for middle and low income clients, the need
for additional innovation and choice within this service sphere persists. 177
The ABA's own 2016 Report of the Commission on the Future of
Legal Services demonstrates that much remains in terms of providing
innovation and access to justice for low- and moderate-income clients. 178
The Report definitively chooses a side and lists the following relevant
findings: (1) "the traditional law practice business model constrains
innovations that would provide greater access to, and enhance the
delivery of, legal services;" (2) "the legal profession's resistance to change
hinders additional innovations;" and (3) "limited data has impeded
efforts to identify and assess the most effective innovations in legal
services delivery."179 The Report ultimately recommends that "courts
should consider regulatory innovations in the area of legal services
delivery" and "the ABA should establish a Center for Innovation."180
With the Report, the ABA will be pressed to justify its continued
restrictions on innovation. The Report also recommended, and other
174 See 2016 ABA REPORT, supra note 13, at 28; LegalShield, SHAKE L., web.shakelaw.com/signin
[http://perma.cc/U8JD-CS7M]; see also Sarah Perez, Fixed, The App That Fixes Your Parking
Tickets, Gets Blocked in San Francisco, Oakland & L.A., TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 12, 2015, 4:00 PM),
http://techcrunch.com/2015/10/12/fixed-the-app-that-fixes-your-parking-tickets-gets-blcoked-
in-san-francisco-oakland-l-a [http://perma.cc/4TPY-XZ4N].
175 2016 ABA REPORT, supra note 13, at 28.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 11.
178 Id. at 37-57.
179 Id. at 5.
18o Id. at 37-57.
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scholars continue to point out the need for, more empirical evidence on
the scope and types of non-traditional and innovative forms of legal
services lawyers are currently utilizing today. 181
Until we fix the failures in the legal profession's integrity system, the
regulatory restrictions will continue to cause such legal entrepreneurs to
operate outside the sanction of the ethical rules in their quest to remain
competitive and provide more efficient legal services to clients.
II. MULTIDISCIPLINARY PROVIDERS
The black market was a way of getting around government controls.
It was a way of enabling the free market to work. It was a way of opening
up, enabling people.
-Milton Friedman182
The failures in our legal profession's integrity system are no more
pronounced than when viewed through the example of the regulatory
treatment and resulting market response of multidisciplinary providers
or "MDPs." Such organizations and firms, where lawyers work together
with other professionals to provide holistic representation and services to
their clients,183 take many forms of associations, ranging from casual
referral agreements to fully integrated organizations where lawyers and
non-lawyers provide services under one business entity. 184 Traditionally,
five different MDP forms have shaped the debates and scholarship
discussing MDPs, each arising as a work-around or response to the
restrictions against lawyer and non-lawyer collaborations. 185
181 Id. at 56.
182 Interview by Commanding Heights, PBS, with Milton Friedman, Economist (Oct. 1, 2000),
https://www-tc.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/press ite/people/pdf/friedman intv.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VX6H-NX5B].
183 Ward Bower, The Big Five's CaseforMDPs, 1999 A.B.A. SEC. L. PRAC. MGMT. ANN. MEETING
185 (2007).
184 See Laurel S. Terry, The Work of the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, in
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICES & PARTNERSHIPS: LAWYERS, CONSULTANTS AND CLIENTS § 2.03
(1999).
185 See ABA Status of Multidisciplinary Practice Studies by State (and Some Local Bar), A.B.A.
[hereinafter ABA State Status Studies], https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional
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Commentators have also developed a number of classification schemes
to categorize the different types of MDPs along some other structural or
service sector line. 186
The ethical and regulatory treatment of MDPs represents the
intersectional outcomes of legal services monopoly, failures in the ethical
codes, restrictions on practice forms, and limitations on innovative
collaborations in both democratic and economic areas of practice. For the
past thirty years, the ABA has debated the regulation of MDPs and how
to address their potential implications on both client outcomes and the
core values of the profession. 187 Despite two different pleas throughout
the years from two special commissions to recognize and regulate MDPs,
the ABA has refused to amend the current Model Rules of Professional
Conduct to allow lawyers to practice with other, non-lawyer professionals
under the same business entity structure. 188
Model Rule 5.4, as currently written, limits the operation of MDPs
by preventing partnerships between lawyers and non-lawyers and profit-
sharing between lawyers and non-lawyers when any of the activities of
the partnership consist of the practice of law. 189 This rule prevents non-
lawyer ownership of law firms and restricts how a lawyer can distribute
her profits: she is allowed to share fees vertically-with paralegals, legal
secretaries, and other administrative officials who work to keep the firm's
lights on-but she is not allowed to share fees on a horizontal level, with
other professionals, such as accountants, business consultants, engineers,
or doctors who may interact with the client on a higher, managerial-type
level and provide professional services to the client. While jurisdictions
such as Australia, England and Wales, and Germany recognize and
regulate MDPs to allow for fee sharing and non-lawyer ownership, D.C.
is the only U.S. jurisdiction to amend its rules to allow for a limited MDP
form. 190
While the debate about MDPs have swung between protecting the
core values of the profession to encouraging innovation and
responsibility/commission multidisciplinary practice/mdp state action/#top [https://perma.cc/
S2FV-E798].
186 See infra Section I1.A.
187 See infra Section I.B.
188 See 2016 ABA REPORT, supra note 13, at 59.
189 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.4 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020).
190 D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.4 (D.C. BAR ASS'N 2015).
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collaboration to stay globally and domestically competitive and improve
holistic client outcomes. This Article adds to this debate by introducing a
call for recognition and regulation by looking at the impact of PwC and
Deloitte's recent additions as a signaling function and by analyzing the
risks truly at stake with the proliferation of smaller firm MDPs where a
single lawyer and accountant may work together versus the implications
of larger market players who may exercise their non-lawyer ownership
and control as a part of the firm's voting majority, like the accounting
firms, and by arguing that rules can be fashioned which address the risks
inherent in MDP structures.
A. MDPs: A Primer
The definition of an MDP has evolved over the years to encompass
the different structural forms through which lawyers provide professional
services with nonlawyer professionals. Five traditional prototypes exist in
the rhetoric and discussions surrounding MDPs since the early 2000s,
which framed much of the debates during that time. 191 The prototypes
differ in the structural and ownership relationships between the
professionals involved, especially with respect to fee-sharing, ownership,
and entity affiliation. As the early 2000 state reports demonstrate, lawyers
and nonlawyers can theoretically and practically operate all five prototype
MDP models in a manner that preserves a lawyer's core values of
professional independence, loyalty, and confidentiality.
1. Definition and Description
Colloquially, the term "multidisciplinary provider" or "MDP" has a
range of meanings and is used collectively to refer to an arrangement in
which a lawyer works closely or in association with other non-lawyers to
provide legal and law-related services. Most of the definitions in the legal
scholarship are too limiting,192 however, and even the ABA's attempt to
191 See ABA State Status Studies, supra note 185, at 182.
192 Bower offers one early definition of an MDP: "an organization owned wholly or in part by
non-lawyers which provides legal services directly to the public through owner or employee
lawyers." Bower, supra note 183.
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capture all of the different types and the myriad structural and
operational nuances inadvertently limits the profit sharing feature of
some MDPs193
Collaboration types between lawyers and nonlawyers respond to
client needs, such as lawyers working with accountants and business
consultants to more efficiently serve organizational clients or 194 medical-
legal partnerships. 195 An economist might work in a firm with antitrust
or public utility practitioners. Psychologists or psychiatric social workers
might work with family law practitioners to assist in counseling clients;
nonlawyer lobbyists might work with lawyers who perform legislative
services; certified public accountants might work in conjunction with tax
lawyers or others who use accountants' services in performing legal
services; and professional managers might serve as office managers,
executive directors, or in similar positions.196
Supporters of MDPs think that MDPs can offer clients from all
income brackets, ranging from sophisticated entity clients to pro bono
clients, lower costs for more comprehensive care due to MDPs' increased
economies of scope and scale. 197 MDPs are often referred to as "one-stop"
193 AM..BAR Ass'N, COMM'N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, RECOMMENDATIONS, REPORT,
AND REPORTERS' NOTES ON THE ABA COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE app. A
(1999), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/commission
multidisciplinary practice/mdpappendixa [https://perma.cc/8DRD-Z7DD ("[A] partnership,
professional corporation, or other association or entity that includes lawyers and nonlawyers and
has as one, but not all, of its purposes the delivery of legal services to a client(s) other than the MDP
itself that holds itself out to the public as providing nonlegal, as well as legal, services. It includes an
arrangement by which a law firm joins with one or more other professional firms to provide
services, and there is a direct or indirect sharing of profits as part of the arrangement.")
194 See Robert J. Reinstein, Afterword: New Roles, No Rules? An International Perspective, 72
TEMP. L. REV. 1031, 1032 n.1 (1999) (Big Five accounting firms should be considered consulting
firms because accounting is now a minority of their total worldwide business); Sheryl Stratton, ABA
Rattles Unauthorized Practice of Law Saber While Debating MDPs, 86 TAX NOTES 1057 (2000).
195 See, e.g., Jane R. Wettach, The Law School Clinic as a Partner in a Medical-Legal Partnership,
75 TENN. L. REV. 305 (2008); MED.-LEGAL PARTNERSHIP FOR CHILD.,
http://www.mlpforchildren.org [https://perma.cc/45KR-84JZJ.
196 WORKING GRP. ON ALT. BUS. STRUCTURES, ABA COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20, FOR COMMENT:
ISSUES PAPER CONCERNING ALTERNATIVE BUSINESS STRUCTURES 8, 18-19 (2011) [hereinafter
ISSUES PAPERS], https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics 2020/abs
issues paper.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/QLN7-MD8E].
197 See Duncan, supra note 151, at 538; Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 35, at 120; MICHAEL
TREBILCOCK & LILLA CSORGO, MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES: A CONSUMER
WELFARE PERSPECTIVE 3 (1999).
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shops for professional services,198 where multiple professionals work
together to fulfill the holistic needs of the client.
Globally and domestically, different industry rules and standards,
particularly the Rules of Professional Conduct in any given jurisdiction,
will either allow or limit a MDPs ability to operate as a single entity, in
which lawyers and non-lawyers share ownership and any legal fees
collected. Notable international jurisdictions that have implemented
alternative business structures for law practice, which allow MDPs to
varying degrees, are Australia, Canada, England and Wales, France,
Germany, the Netherlands, Scotland, Spain, and New Zealand.199
Australia serves as the global model for MDPs or alternative business
structures, as Australia has since 1998 proactively adapted its legal market
to incorporate alternative legal practices, allowing MDPs and non-lawyer
investment in law firms, including the first initial public offering of shares
in a law firm in 2007.200 This adaptation has created a global market for
Australian lawyers and MDPs, particularly in Asian markets in Hong
Kong and throughout China. 201
Other countries, recognizing the limited growth potential these
restrictions place on legal entrepreneurs seeking to say competitive in
today's market, have removed this structural and financial limitation.202
In 2007, Slater and Gordon was the first law firm to become publicly
traded on the Australian Stock Exchange, with three others following suit
shortly thereafter.203 While we are yet to see the impacts of that ten-year-
198 See Duncan, supra note 151, at 538.
199 See Hill, supra note 34, at 925 n.94; ISSUES PAPERS, supra note 196, at 15-16.
200 See Paton, MDP Redux, supra note 147, at 2196 n.13; Paul D. Paton, Between a Rock and
Hard Place: The Future of Self-Regulation -Canada Between the United States and the
English/Australian Experience, 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 87, 104-07 [hereinafter Paton, Rock and a Hard
Place].
201 Paton, MDP Redux, supra note 147, at 2242. As of July 2011, in New South Wales, 921
incorporated legal practices were reported out of 4742 total practices (19.4% of private practices).
STEVE MARK ET AL., PRESERVING THE ETHICS AND INTEGRITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AN
EVOLVING MARKET: A COMPARATIVE REGULATORY RESPONSE 12 (2001),
http://www.olsc.nsw.gov.au/Documents/preserving%/20ethics%/20integrity%/20legal%/
20profession%20uk paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2ZL- YJDV].
202 See Paton, MDP Redux, supra note 147, at 2196; Paton, Rock and Hard Place, supra note 200,
at 104-07; Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 35, at 116.
203 See Andrew Grech & Kirsten Morrison, Slater & Gordon: The Listing Experience, 22 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 535 (2009).
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old IPO, the move has already proven a boon for the competitiveness of
Australian lawyers. Regulators there are "aggressively investigating how
regulatory frameworks can further be adjusted to ensure that Australian
lawyers are poised to compete both from domestic bases and abroad."204
The ABA's position against MDPs and the mixed support from the
different state bars do not appear to have deterred the continued
development and operation of MDPs, among a variety of different
structures and offering a variety of professional services. In the United
States in particular, lawyers continue to work with non-lawyer
professionals in order to respond to global economic demands.205
Sophisticated clients increasingly demand more cost efficient delivery of
professional and legal services and are willing to look globally for an MDP
that makes the most economic sense.206 To stay competitive with our
international counterparts, the bar must embrace innovative methods of
collaborative professional and legal services.207 While it may be too late
for the United States to get out ahead of the developing global legal
market, at best the United States can try to keep pace.
The majority of MDPs, however, are smaller organizations,
composed of lawyers and nonlawyers who aim to provide a more efficient
and comprehensive, and therefore more socially just, experience for their
clients.208 These small firm MDPs developed in response to on-the-
ground community needs, often with an aim to fulfill a certain social
justice mission.209 Professionals in these MDPs are able to communicate
with one another and ensure quality, coordinated, holistic care, often at
one convenient location for their clients.210 These clients are often in need
of legal and emotional assistance as their legal situations are symptomatic
of deeper, socio-legal and socio-economic disadvantages.11 Practitioners
204 Paton, MDP Redux, supra note 147, at 2242.
205 See Talha A. Zobair, Point-Counterpoint-Multidisciplinary Practices-Firms of the Future,
79 MICH. B.J. 64,64-65 (2000).
206 See Dzienkowski, supra note 14, at 2996.
2U7 Id. at 2995.
2U8 See Hill, supra note 34, at 9 3 5 (citing GORELICK & TRAYNOR, supra note 14, at 2).
209 See Brustin, supra note 14, at 788; Steven H. Hobbs, The Ethics and Professional Norms of
Family Business Centers, in THE FAMILY Bus. CTR., STETSON UNIV., FAMILY BUSINESS GATHERING
2000: THE HOLISTIC MODEL 9 (Greg McCann & Nancy B. Upton eds., 2000).
21 Brustin, supra note 14, at 788.
211 Id.
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who work with society's most vulnerable communities continue to argue
that multi-faceted client needs demand an integrated approach to
representation. 212
2. Prototypes
MDPs structure and operate their organizations in a variety of ways.
They exist as strictly arms-length partnerships between legal and non-
legal entities, to fully integrated models, where the MDP offers all
professional services under one entity.213 While each MDP functions
uniquely, each has a particular method of dealing with issues of
confidentiality, conflicts of interest and intake protocols, lawyer
independence and non-lawyer ownership, fee sharing, and whether to
operate as a non-profit or for-profit MDP.214 MDPs currently operate
under a range of five generally accepted prototypes: the Cooperative
Model, the Ancillary Business Model, the Contract or Strategic Alliance
Model, the Command and Control Model, and the Fully Integrated
Model.
a. The Cooperative Model
The Cooperative Model occurs when a firm delivers legal services on
a "standalone" basis in "cooperation" with other nonlawyer professionals.
Fee-splitting and co-principal relationships with nonlawyers are
prohibited. Lawyers are free to employ nonlawyer professionals under the
lawyer's control to assist in providing legal services to clients, and lawyers
are also free to work with nonlawyer professionals employed directly by
clients. The lawyers' services ultimately "standalone" from all other
services.215
b. The Ancillary Business Model
This model permits a law firm to own and operate an ancillary
business entity that provides nonlegal services to clients. The entities,
212 Id.
213 See infra Section I.B.
214 Brustin, supra note 14, at 788.
25 The California Board of Governors Task Force in 2001 completed the ABA's study. See ABA
State Status Studies, supra note 185.
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however, operate on a non-integrated basis, and lawyers provide legal
services on a "standalone" basis. ABA Model Rule 5.7 on ancillary
services, requires that recipients of the ancillary services understand that
the ancillary business exists as an entity separate and distinct from the law
firm.216
c. The Contract or Strategic Alliance Model
The Contract or Strategic Alliance Model requires an express
agreement between a law firm and a professional service firm setting forth
various mutually beneficial terms. The agreement might state that: (1) the
law firm notes an affiliate on all law firm materials; (2) the law firm and
professional firm will engage in nonexclusive referrals; or (3) the law firm
purchase goods and services from the professional firm.217 This model
does not allow fee-splitting or common ownership interests. The legal
services are also "standalone."218
d. The Command and Control Model
Under the Command and Control Model, currently authorized in
D.C., lawyers are permitted to share law firm fees and ownership interests
with nonlawyers subject to specific limitations, including requirements
that: "(1) the activities of the firm be limited to the provision of legal
services; (2) the involved nonlawyers agree to comply with the lawyers'
rules of professional conduct; and (3) the lawyers, who are principals or
who have management authority, take responsibility for the acts of the
nonlawyers."29 Although fees and equity interests are shared with
nonlawyers, all services are controlled by lawyers and relate directly to the
rendition of legal services.220
e. The Fully Integrated Model
The Fully Integrated Model is a single, fully integrated professional
services firm. The single firm provides legal services, consulting services,
accounting services, or other professional services. It is marketed as a
216 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.7 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020).
2P See ABA State Status Studies, supra note 185.
218 Id.
219 Id.; D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.4 (D.C. BAR ASS'N 2015).
22. D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.4 (D.C. BAR ASS'N 2015).
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"one-stop shop" for clients with legal and other professional needs.221 The
professions provide various services to a single client on a single matter
or on multiple related (or unrelated) matters. The lawyers can provide
legal services independently from others, and vice versa.222
Of the five MDP prototypes, only the Command and Control Model
and the Fully Integrated Model allow an attorney to share fees with non-
lawyers. The California Board of Governors' Task Force, set with
studying MDPs in 2000, ultimately concluded that under all five models,
including the Fully Integrated Model, the professionals can operate the
MPD in a manner that maintains the "core values" of the legal profession
and in fact, reaffirms them "through the principle that all professionals
involved may not, by virtue of their integration with other professionals,
reduce their responsibilities below those which apply to a non-integrated
environment."223
B. Regulation of MDPs
It was not until the adoption of Canons 33 through 35 in the 1920s
that the ABA passed rules that began to impact how lawyers can deliver
legal services, prohibiting partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers
when any of the partnership's business consists of the practice of law.224
Canon 34 prohibited fee sharing,225 and Canon 35 made an exhortatory
plea, reminding lawyers to not be controlled by any intervening person
or business between lawyer and client.226 The Code of Professional
Responsibility of 1969 incorporated Canons 33 through 35 without much
amendment into the version of Rule 5.4 that we have today.
221 ABA State Status Studies, supra note 185.
222 Id.
223 Id. See generally Michael W. Loudenslager, Cover Me: The Effects of Attorney-Accountant
Multidisciplinary Practice on the Protections of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 53 BAYLOR L. REv. 33,
48(2001).
224 Canons 33-45 were adopted at he ABA's annual meeting in 1928. Proceedings, 53 A.B.A.
Rep. 29, 130 (1928).
225 CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS No. 34 (AM. BAR ASS'N 1963).




At the end of the 1990s and the years following the turn of the
century, global focus convened on MDPs, considered by some as "the
most important problem facing the legal profession" at the time.227 The
catalyst for international regulatory interest in MDPs was the
development of the business operations of the Big Five (now Big Four)
accounting firms, which led efforts for reform to partner with lawyers in
various European countries.228 Lawyers and nonlawyers in countries
outside of the United States began to offer MDP services to clients
because regulatory restrictions in those jurisdictions were less stringent.
In 1996, the International Bar Association created a standing committee
to study MDPs globally.229 In September 1998, the committee
recommended that regulators allow MDPs, so long as the client and
"public interests are adequately protected."230
The ABA, concerned about the impact that this recommendation
would have on international MDPs and the U.S. global legal market share,
appointed a special commission called the Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice to investigate and report on MDP practices in
the United States.231 A year later, the Commission recommended that
"the Model Rules of Professional Conduct be amended, subject to certain
restrictions, to permit a lawyer to partner with a nonlawyer even if the
activities of the enterprise consisted of the practice of law and to share
legal fees with a nonlawyer."232 However, the ABA ignored its
Commission's recommendation,233 arguing that fee sharing and
227 Christensen, At the Helm, supra note 34, at 375.
228 Dzienkowski, supra note 14, at 2995; Loudenslager, supra note 223, at 46.
229 Christensen, At the Helm, supra note 34, at 376.
230 Id. at 376 (citing Bower, supra note 183, at 186).
231 Dzienkowski, supra note 14, at 127.
232 Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Updated Background and Informational Report and
Request for Comments, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/
commission multidisciplinary practice/febmdp [https://perma.cc/KXY2-FLLC]; Christensen, At
the Helm, supra note 34, at 376-77.
233 Christensen, At the Helm, supra note 34, at 377 & n.14.
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ownership between lawyers and nonlawyers threaten an attorney's
independent judgment.234
In the years immediately following the ABA's recommendation, a
majority of the state bar associations or their equivalents conducted
independent studies of MDPs.235 The responsive actions from state bar
associations ranged from conducting no study at all,236 to conducting a
formal study without making a recommendation,37 to making a
recommendation to reject MDPs and protect the "core values" of the
profession,238 to making a recommendation to allow and regulate MDPs
with different levels of integration among professionals. 239 The District of
Columbia is the only jurisdiction in the United States, however, to have
formally approved the operation of MDPs and amended its Rules of
Professional Conduct to allow a certain limited form of MDP, namely the
Command and Control Model.240 The ABA recommendation and the
mixed reactions from the states did not deter, however, the development
of MDPs throughout the United States. Arizona's formal study, for
example, states that de facto MDPs already exist in the state.2 41 Market
and client demands for convenience drove the organic development of
the MDP industry.242
In 2009, the ABA created a special "Commission on Ethics 20/20" in
order to address the twenty-first century social change and the evolution
of the legal profession.43 Acutely aware of the status quo in which "U.S.
lawyers and law firms [were] increasingly doing business abroad or
affiliating with non-U.S. firms that have different business tructures than
their own," the Commission sought to consider how to preserve the core
234 These "core values" are maintaining independence, protecting privilege, and avoiding
conflicts of interest. See id. at 385.





24u For a more in-depth discussion of the D.C. rule, see infra pp. 2325-26.
241 See ABA State Status Studies, supra note 185; see also Yarbrough, supra note 29, at 659.
242 See Daly, supra note 14, at 274-75.
243 See Hill, supra note 34, at 934; ABA COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20, INTRODUCTION AND
OVERVIEW (2013), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics 2020/




values of the legal profession "while simultaneously permitting U.S.
lawyers and law firms to participate on a level playing field in a global
legal services marketplace."244 The Working Group on Alternative
Business Structures heard evidence that small firms are interested in
having nonlawyer partners.2 45 In December 2011, Ethics 20/20 published
a draft resolution for comment which would amend Model Rule 5.4 to
permit nonlawyers to have minority interests in law firms and permit fee-
sharing, if, however, the firm only engages in the practice of law. 246 Based
on the comments, however, Ethics 20/20 determined not to recommend
that the ABA amend Rule 5.4, again leaving MDPs as operating outside
of the ethical approval of the ABA. 247
2. Rule 5.4
ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 5.4 limits the ability
of lawyers to provide professional services in a collaborative professional
environment through four distinct but overlapping prohibitions.
a. No Fee-Sharing
Subpart (a) of Rule 5.4 provides: "A lawyer or law firm shall not
share legal fees with a nonlawyer.... " This subpart flatly prohibits fee
sharing with nonlawyers, except in limited circumstances which do not
implicate MDPs.248 Subpart (a) does go on to provide that a lawyer may
share court-awarded legal fees with a nonprofit organization that
employed, retained, or recommended the lawyer.249 But this exception
only applies in limited situations when a lawyer is awarded attorneys' fees,
244 See Hill, supra note 34, at 934-35.
245 Id. at 935; JAMIE S. GORELICK & MICHAEL TRAYNOR, ABA COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20, FOR
COMMENT: DISCUSSION PAPER ON ALTERNATIVE LAW PRACTICE STRUCTURES 2 (2011),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics 2020/20111202-
ethics202o-discussion draft-alps.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/UJ8J-EMZU].
246 GORELICK &TRAYNOR, supra note 245.
247 See Hill, supra note 34, at 941; Joan C. Rogers, Ethics 20120 Ditches Idea of Recommending
Option for Nonlawyer Owners in Law Firms, 28 ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROF'L
CONDUCT 250,251 (2012).
248 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020). For the complete text of
Model Rule 5.4, see infra Appendix A.
249 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.4(a)(4) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020).
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which would likely occur in the course of providing democratic-based
services and only in a litigation setting. This exception would thus not
implicate fee-sharing with a nonprofit in the course of providing
transactional or economic-based services, such as fee-sharing in the
course of holding a wills and end of life directive workshop. The
prohibition on fee sharing is thus a broad proscription.
b. No Partnerships
Subpart (b) of Rule 5.4 provides: "A lawyer shall not form a
partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership
consist of the practice of law."25o While a simple rule, its implications are
vast. First, this subpart prohibits partnerships with a nonlawyer if any of
the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law, which
implicates the generally undefined but far-reaching definition of the
"practice of law." Thus, looking at D.C.'s definition of the practice of law
as an example, the "practice of law" includes not only litigation and
transactional services, but also counseling on how to manage a client's
legal needs and furnishing the attorneys to provide those services.251 Both
Vista Law and Axiom Law potentially violate this part of the rule if they
have nonlawyer partners.25 2 Both provide attorneys on short and long
term bases to fill unmet organizational in-house needs, and Axiom Law
also provides legal business consulting services to clients, structuring
legal needs for efficiency and cost.253
This subpart has also caused a great deal of consternation among
legal practitioners because of its unclear implications on non-profit
partnerships or MDPs. The Rules do not further define what it means by
a "partnership" at least not in a manner that distinguishes between for
profit and non-profit activities. A common law definition of
partnership-two or more persons associating to sell a good or service for
a profit-suggests that this rule should only apply to for-profit
partnerships.254 However, some argue that relying on the common law
definition of "partnership" in this context is too ambiguous, and that
25U Id. r. 5.4(b).
25 D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 49 (D.C. BAR ASS'N 2015).
252 See supra Section I.C.
253 Dzienkowski, supra note 14, at 3008.
254 Partnership, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11 th ed. 2019).
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non-profit MDPs need a specific rule.255 In fact, the definitions for
purposes of the rules seem to turn on whether the entity provides
professional legal services.256 Further, each state will have a different,
nuanced definition of what constitutes a "partnership" for purposes of
Rule 5.4, and a survey of state ethics opinions on the matter indicate that
whether non-profit MDPs are also prohibited under subpart (b) is up to
each state's interpretation.257 Also, subpart (d) of the rule, discussed
below, which makes an explicit reference to "for profit" activities,
supports the argument that non-profits are not meant to be excluded
from subpart (b) like they are from subpart (d). Finally, if non-profits are
excluded, then what rules regulate them? Are they free to otherwise
ignore the remainder of Rule 5.4?
c. Maintain Professional Independence
Subpart (c) provides: "A lawyer shall not permit a person who
recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for
another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in
rendering such legal services."258 This subsection gets at the heart of the
matter, and requires that a lawyer not permit anyone with monetary or
other influence over the lawyer to direct or regulate the professional
independence of a lawyer.259 Few scholars have issues with this aspect of
the Rule; this author has not found any arguments that favor somehow
diminishing the importance of maintaining a lawyer's professional
judgment, nor does this author think this duty should change. This
position is not taken merely as a hallmark to the lawyer's duty to remain
steadfast in the face of despotism,260 but also based off of our recent
dealings with lawyers involved in the Enron scandal while employed by
the now defunct accounting firm Arthur Anderson, who many argue
allowed the accounting firm to force the attorneys working at Arthur
Anderson to turn a blind eye to the improper "special purpose entities"
255 See Brustin, supra note 14, at 864-65 (discussing how rules should be clarified to allow non-
profit MDPs).
256 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.0 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020).
257 See Colo. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm. Formal Op. 87 (1990) (discussing "collaboration with non-
Lawyers in preparation and marketing of estate planning documents").
258 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.4(c) (AM. BAR. ASS'N 2020).
259 Id.
260 See infra Section LA. 1.
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to hide risks that Enron could not financially bare.261 While the Arthur
Anderson example is "tricky" because of the claim that their attorneys
were "practicing tax," they were lawyers working with tax laws,
nonetheless, and we have a pretty evident example from past experience
how damaging and far reaching the repeated impingement of a lawyer's
professional judgment can be. No one is arguing that we should somehow
lessen or remove this "core value" of the legal profession.
d. For Profit Professional Law Practice Restrictions
Subpart (d) provides:
A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional
corporation or association authorized to practice law for a
profit, if: (1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein .... (2) a
nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof or occupies
the position of similar responsibility in any form of association
other than a corporation; or (3) a nonlawyer has the right to
direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer.262
The scope of subpart (d) is also broad. It prohibits any type of
ownership, either active or passive, by a nonlawyer. That, coupled with
subpart (a), nonlawyers are thus not able to be owners or share fees with
lawyers. Further, nonlawyers cannot have any board authority or
managerial authority in the legal organization. This relegates the
nonlawyer to the status of an employee, in the same way that an associate
attorney without the opportunity to make partner would be. One of the
critiques of Rule 5.4 is that it requires any nonlawyer involved to be an
employee and does not provide the professional the opportunity for
managerial or ownership if she were providing professional services
without the collaboration of the legal services side.263 Finally, nonlawyers
cannot direct or control the activities of the lawyer, which is meant to
reinforce the lawyer's duty to maintain its professional independence.
Because subpart (d) explicitly applies to law practices for a profit, the
rule is still unclear on how it applies, if at all, to non-profit MDPs and
legal services organizations. Does this mean, for example, that Rule 5.4(d)
261 Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate
Structures, 70 U. CINN. L. REv. 1309,1310-11 (2002).
262 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.4 (AM. BAR. ASS'N 2020).
263 See D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.4 cmt. [3], [7] (D.C. BAR ASS'N 2015).
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does not apply to non-profits? In other words, can a non-profit law firm
have a nonlawyer as a director or corporate officer or its equivalent
managerial position? Further, a lawyer still cannot share fees with the
non-profit professional and partner unless court awarded in a litigation
setting. It is unclear from the rules what restrictions apply to non-profit
MDPs where all parties involved are not for profit.
3. D.C. Rule 5.4
The District of Columbia is the only jurisdiction to take positive
steps to amend its Rules of Professional Conduct to allow for Command
and Control-type MDPs.264 D.C.'s Rule 5.4 permits fee-sharing and
partnerships among professionals in an MDP, but the business must meet
certain requirements that limit the nature of services an authorized MDP
can offer, requiring that the business's ole purpose must be the provision
of legal services,265 all owners and managers must abide by the D.C. Rules
of Professional conduct,266 lawyers must have a supervisory capacity over
and responsibility for any non-lawyers as if they were lawyers,267 and the
business must put these requirements in writing.268 Thus, while the D.C.
rules seem to explicitly authorize fee-sharing and for profit MDPs, the
type of MDPs who could operate legally under these rules still resemble
traditional standalone law firms today in which lawyers have managerial
authority over all associates and paralegals. What this rule then allows is
a law firm's ability to work with accountants or financial planners, for
example, who might work in-house at the law firm but are still supervised
by the lawyer-managers to assist clients. Subsection (b) specifically limits
the participation of non-lawyers to "individuals," excluding other
business entities, such as accounting firms from participating in the D.C.
MDP model. 269
According to the comments, the purpose of D.C.'s amendment
allowing a nonlawyer to have ownership and management authority is to
264 Id. r. 5.4.
265 Id. r. 5.4(b)(1).
266 Id. r. 5.4(b)(2).
267 Id. r. 5.4(b)(3).
268 Id. r. 5.4(b)(4).
269 Id. r. 5.4(b).
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permit nonlawyer professionals to work with lawyers in the delivery of
legal services "without being relegated to the role of an employee." 270 In
all of these situations, the professionals may be given financial interests
or managerial responsibility, so long as other requirements ensuring
lawyer independence are met.
C. Current MDP Debate
With the accounting profession's latest introduction of PwC's ILC
Legal and Deloitte's legal partnership, the legal profession in the United
States must again and with renewed vigor address the implications of
Rule 5.4 and MDPs. Most of the current debate in favor of continuing to
ban MDPs still center around protecting the "core values," but also more
explicitly address concerns about maintaining the lawyers' market shares
and the potential disintegration and segmentation of the profession,
continuing to use "unauthorized practice of law" as a saber to maintain a
monopoly over legal services.2 71 Others accepted this underlying
motivation and argued that "core values" was no excuse to ignore market
forces and to preclude investigating ways in which the legal profession
could adapt in order to protect its sustainability and necessity in the
delivery of legal and law related services.272 Most of the arguments
supporting recognition and regulation of MDPs focus on maintaining
and improving global and national competitiveness, supporting
innovations in the legal services market, improving holistic client
outcomes, and improving lawyer professional satisfaction with
collaborative and non-traditional law firm practice models.
27U Id. cmt. 7.
271 See Paton, Redux, supra note 147, at 2213; Hill, supra note 34, at 945; Bruce A. Green, The
Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice: Their Derivation, Their Development, and
Some Implications for the Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1115, 1144-45 (2000); Burnele V.
Powell, Flight from the Center, Is It just or Just About Money?, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1439, 1453-54
(2000) [hereinafter Powell, Flight from the Center].
272 See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 35, at 90.
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1. For Continued Ban
Since the MDP debates first began in the late 1990s, the most
prominent and colorful voice against recognizing MDPs has been
Lawrence J. Fox, the former vice president of the ABA and a partner at a
prominent Philadelphia law firm.273 Fox's main rallying cries center
around preserving the professional independence of lawyers, ensuring
loyalty, and maintaining confidentiality.274 These are three of the "core
values" of the legal profession that do not have a theoretical or doctrinal
parallel in the accounting profession.275 Similarly, scholars often raise the
directly conflicting duties of confidentiality of lawyers and mandatory
reporting requirements of social workers in lawyer-social worker
MDPs.276 Arguments which relied upon the importance of upholding the
"core values" of lawyers carried the day in the late 1990s277 and shrouded
the state-by-state studies that each state performed in the early 2000s. For
the states rejecting the adoption of MDPs, each directly or implicitly
alluded to preserving the core values of professional independence,
loyalty, competence, and confidentiality.278
Considering the potential implications of fee sharing and nonlawyer
ownership on these relevant core values, the concerns of those who
oppose MDPs are worth consideration. And MDPs do pose risks to a
lawyer's professional independence, which requires that we proceed with
thoughtful consideration as to how to protect clients while promoting
innovation and efficient services.
a. Professional Independence of a Lawyer
The argument for maintaining Rule 5.4 as-is provides that a lawyer
employed, paid, or controlled by a nonlawyer supervisor or corporate
273 See Fox, Hawks, supra note 10; Written Remarks of Lawrence J. Fox: You've Got the Soul of
the Profession in Your Hands, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional
responsibility/commission multidisciplinary practice/fox 1 [https://perma.cc/6M4L-ECUJ].
274 See Fox, Hawks, supra note 10, at 1102-04.
275 See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 35, at 138. But see 26 U.S.C. § 7525 (2018) (Congress
created specialized tax practitioner-client privilege).
276 See Jean Koh Peters, Concrete Strategies for Managing Ethically-Based Conflicts Between
Children's Lawyers and Consulting Social Workers Who Serve the Same Client, 1 Ky. CHILD. RTS. J.
15, 15 (1991).
277 Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 35, at 135-36.
278 See ABA State Status Studies, supra note 185.
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officer might compromise her independence to bend to the larger desires
of the organization at the expense of her professional judgment. While
the economic pressure is a valid concern, there are practical ways that
lawyers working in MDPs set up processes and procedures where
nonlawyers have no control or management over the substance of the
legal services provided.
b. Duty of Confidentiality
In the context of MDPs, how to address the lawyer's duty of
confidentiality is another valid concern. One can imagine a situation in
which a client is speaking with a social worker and a lawyer working
together in a non-profit MDP, who thinks that the conversation is
confidential and discloses something that may implicate or trigger the
social worker's mandatory reporting requirement.279 To address this
quite real concern, D.C.'s Rule 5.4 requires flatly that the nonlawyers
involved in the MDP are subject to the lawyer's ethical rules.280 But the
D.C. rule does not address how an MDP should address confidentiality
when the nonlawyer professional might have a reporting requirement.281
MDPs take numerous approaches to dealing with the conflicting
reporting and confidentiality duties, but the most common appears to be
acquiring informed consent from the client about the nature of the
collaborative services, the differing confidentiality and reporting duties,
and the consent from the client to receiving legal services in the MDP
setting.
c. Duty to Avoid Conflicts of Interest
Less practical information exists on how MDPs address and handle
potential conflicts of interest. The issues arise when considering how far
the lawyer's duty to avoid conflicts of interest extend to nonlawyers in the
MDP. Should the conflicts extend to all professional services, or just legal
services? Should the conflicts rules be imputed to nonlawyers in all MDP
entity types, or only the fully integrated ones? Should MDPs only be
219 See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, CHILDREN'S BUREAU, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (2019), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/manda.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J339-ZXW3].




conflicted out of certain litigation based work or transactional work based
on content? The potential scope and reach of the lawyer's rules on
conflicts of interest in an MDP is a valid concern considering the
potential harm to a client, especially in a litigation-based MDP. Even in
transactional MDPs, conflicts are key. PwC and ILC Legal, for example,
are structured so that the law firm will not provide legal services to PwC's
auditing clients.282 This rule based on content of the representation also
addresses the confidentiality duties of the lawyers and the public auditing
function of the accountants involved.
d. Protection of the Legal Profession
When the ABA Commission recommended that the ABA allow
some regulated form of MDPs, at least those who continued to oppose
MDPs were more open about their fears of the end of self-regulation,
instead of clinging to rhetoric about core values.283 While some
commentators during the late 1990s hearings also reported on fears of
"blending" the legal profession with others,284 during the 2010s, the
competition undercurrent was more explicitly the focus. The debate
turned then not on how to preserve the core values, but how to compete
with the accounting profession while avoiding the "distasteful" notion of
picking up a divorce at a "Wal-Mart."285 With the 2017 opening of PwC's
ILC Legal in D.C., those who oppose MDPs will be hard pressed to deny
the benefits to corporate clients and the competitive advantages that
MDPs provide. Arguments for a ban would have to center around
protecting clients, as there has been little evidence that the caliber of legal
services provided through MDPs is less stringent than in a traditional,
stand-alone law firm setting.
2. For Recognition and Regulation
The majority of the modern legal scholarship supports some form of
recognition and regulation of MDPs. The reasons in support of allowing
MDPs range from maintaining an inter-professional competitive
282 See Johnson, supra note 7.
283 See Hill, supra note 34, at 942-43.
284 See Swan, supra note 19, at 158.
285 Rhode, supra note 19, at 119.
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advantage, improving client services by providing holistic and one-stop-
shopping, and creating more client choice, to improving the professional
and personal satisfaction of lawyers as a viable alternative to traditional
law firm life.
Other scholars use the MDP example as a case study to make larger
critiques of the regulation of the legal profession.286 Many scholars looked
to advancements made in Australia, European countries, and Canada for
comparison.287 Some scholars used market and regulatory approaches to
develop models for MDPs in the United States.288 Others, motivated by
the need to more efficiently service the needs of both low income and
sophisticated clients, provided empirical data on the need to serve such
clients.289
In our post-regulatory competition state,290 arguments about market
competitiveness may have the most impact today.291 In 2015, the Big Four
accounting firms employed 8,500 attorneys worldwide.292 Many lawyers
286 See Gillian K. Hadfield & Deborah L. Rhode, How to Regulate Legal Services to Promote
Access, Innovation, and the Quality of Lawyering, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1191 (2016); Hadfield, Legal
Barriers, supra note 15, at 1692; John H. Matheson & Peter D. Favorite, Multidisciplinary Practice
and the Future of the Legal Profession: Considering a Rolefor Independent Directors, 32 LoY. U. CHI.
L.J. 577, 577-78 (2001); Paul D. Patton, Cooperation, Co-Option or Coercion, 2010 J. PROF. LAW.
165 (2010); Swan, supra note 19, at 153; George C. Nnona, Situating Multidisciplinary Practice
within Social History: A Systemic Analysis of Inter-Professional Competition, 80 ST. JOHNS L. REV.
849, 852 (2006).
287 See Christensen, At the Helm, supra note 35, at 391-92; G. Ellis Duncan, The Rise of
Multidisciplinary Practices in Europe and the Future of the Global Legal Profession Following Arthur
Andersen v. Netherlands Bar Ass'n, 9 TUL. J. INT'L COMP. L. 537 (2001); Katherine L. Harrison,
Multidisciplinary Practices: Changing the Global View of the Legal Profession, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 879, 880 (2000) [hereinafter Harrison, Multidisciplinary Practices]; Paton, MDP Redux,
supra note 147, at 2194-95; Paton, Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 200, at 87.
288 See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 35, at 206.
289 See Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment of the
Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129 (2010); Gillian K.
Hadfield, Legal Infrastructure and the New Economy, 8 1/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 1 (2012).
29U See Julian Webb, Regulating Lawyers in a Liberalized Legal Services Market: The Role of
Education and Training, 24 STAN. L. &POL'Y REV. 533, 535 (2013).
291 See Johnson, supra note 7.
292 See Bruch, supra note 7. Bruch compares the Big Four's lawyers to large global law firm
numbers. If ranked with the law firms, the Big Four would rank sixth (PwC, 2,500 lawyers in 85
countries), ninth (KMG, 2.200 lawyers in 53 countries), tenth (Ernst & Young, 2,000 lawyers in 76




working in accounting firms state that they are not in violation of Rule
5.4 because they are "practicing tax" and not "practicing law." Our MDP
prohibition "compel[s] such expatriates to characterize the services they
provide as something other than 'legal services' and we exclude such
offerings from the bar's ethical and disciplinary system."293 Because of
this fissure, the Big Four accounting firms have brought "the sexy back"
into the auditing business by slowly expanding their services into
consulting, financial planning, legal management and strategy, and legal
services.294 These Big Four firms are also more risk-bearing, due to their
size, and have historically taken risks and been able to survive, either
through mergers or continued market growth after failed compliance or
lost public confidence.295 In order to stay remotely competitive with
accounting firms, the legal profession needs to make some moves up top
within the regulatory scheme to allow its large firms to diversify as well.
Recognizing and regulating MDPs can also benefit low- and
moderate-income clients. Grassroots support for MDPs is
overwhelmingly in favor of MDP recognition and regulation as well.
Regardless of the increased competitiveness of such a move, MDP
proponents have argued for years that MDPs improve client outcomes
and access to justice, providing convenient one-stop-shopping, as well as
holistic professional services.296 Such holistic care provides clients,
especially low- and moderate-income clients, with professional care that
they often do not even know they need. 297 Consumers appear to receive a
more convenient and comprehensive experience.
There are even federal and state programs that fund social justice
MDPs because of their improved access to justice,298 and the ABA's own
293 See Harrison, supra note 287, at 920-21.
294 See Fox, Hawks, supra note 10, at 1098 (arguing that the audit business alone promised slow
growth and little romance).
295 See Elijah D. Farrell, Accounting Firms and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Who Is the Bar
Really Trying to Protect?, 33 IND. L. REv. 599, 599 (2000); Kenneth Li, Merger of Price Waterhouse,
Coopers Firm Creates "Big 5," BUFF. NEWS, Sept. 19, 1997, at A12.
296 See Poser, supra note 30, at 95.
297 See George C. Harris & Derek F. Foran, The Ethics of Middle-Class Access to Legal Services
and What We Can Learn from the Medical Profession's Shift to a Corporate Paradigm, 70 FORDHAM
L. REv. 775, 802 (2001).
298 For example, the Abandoned Infants Assistance Program at the federal level and through
various sources at the state level provided funding for the MDP operating in New Mexico. Trubek
& Farnham, supra note 44, at 232.
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white paper on "unregulated legal service providers (LSPs)," included as
part of the 2016 Report of the Future of Legal Services, recommends some
form of recognition, whether performed by lawyers or nonlawyers.299 The
practical arguments in favor of MDP recognition can actually work
together with explicit fears about professional competition to create an
environment where lawyers preserve their core values and cultivate their
entrepreneurial spirits.
Attorneys who offer services through MDPs report more
professional satisfaction, as an MDP allows them to break away from the
traditional law firm 2000 hour/year billing model.300 MDPs also provide
for a more collaborative working environment for attorneys, who see
firsthand the positive impacts that holistic professional services have on
clients.301 MDPs also cultivate lawyers' entrepreneurial spirits, and the
new collaborations and improved client efficiencies increase methods to
offer new unbundled legal and professional services to new markets.302
To stay competitive and to continue these positive improvements for
clients and lawyers, the legal profession must re-assess and re-open its
inquiry into recognizing MDPs on a much larger scale and with renewed
vigor.
If we do nothing, then we will be casting our legal entrepreneurs into
a precarious position where they must risk ethical compliance to pursue
innovation service delivery models to respond to market competition and
clients demands for efficiency and choice. Laurel S. Terry, a foremost
authority on MDPs in the United States and abroad and who testified in
support of MDPs during the ABA's hearings, predicted that continuing
to ban MDPs would result in "two worlds of lawyers, one regulated and
one unregulated."303 She continues, "This parallel world of lawyers-
some regulated and some unregulated-will only become larger as MDPs
proliferate."304 In that sense, Terry's prediction came true, as there is a
299 2016 ABA REPORT, supra note 13, at 66.
300 See Poser, supra note 30, at 114-15.
301 See id.; Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 35, at 166 ("[A] common partnership fosters a
shared culture and produces a consistently high-quality work product with uniform attention to
professional standards.").
302 See Phoebe A. Haddon, The MDP Controversy: What Legal Educators Should Know, 50 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 504, 516 (2000).




growing sector of lawyers who practice in non-legal firms under the guise
of providing tax or non-legal work, who claim not to be engaged in the
practice of law.305
Whether Terry's assessment of the potential proliferation of MDPs
is accurate remains to be seen. Since the state-by-state commissions that
studied MDPs in the early 2000s, there is relatively little empirical data
about the actual number of MDPs and how they operate, so an actual full
snap shot or cross section of the vibrancy and variety of U.S. MDP
offerings does not exist. 306 Until it does, their full extent and reach will
remain a mystery because of their continued outlaw and because those
involved are not always apt to volunteer such information.
She also warned that she considers the world of unregulated MDPs
"dangerous: it will breed disrespect for the law and legal ethics rules, and
it may create a race to the bottom. Some lawyers can obtain a competitive
advantage by ignoring the legal ethics rules."307 From the MDPs and other
alternative legal service providers studied in this Article, lawyers in MDPs
do attempt to stay competitive, but do not appear to have ignored their
fundamental duties of confidentiality and conflicts of interest, even if they
ignore the fee-sharing and non-lawyer ownership limits of Rule 5.4.308
Lawyers have not simply shed their ethical duties to their clients in
their quest to stay competitive. They practice in MDPs despite the
potential risks because of their commitment to providing holistic and
efficient professional services to clients and to improving the professional
satisfaction of lawyers in a changing professional world. Since the MDP
debates began, lawyers who opposed their recognition rallied that those
lawyers and other professionals who practiced in an MDP engage in civil
disobedience every day.309 While these statements were likely made with
a critical and shocking affect, this language actually belies these lawyers'
larger place in effecting change.
35 Id. at 879.
306 See cf Daly, supra note 14, at 247. This author plans to conduct an empirical study in order
to gather more information on the operations of U.S. MDPs.
3U7 Terry, Primer, supra note 25, at 920.
308 See Poser, supra note 30, at 122.
309 See Terry, Primer, supra note 25, at 930.
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3. Call to Recognize and Regulate
This Article calls for recognition and regulation of all forms of
MDPs, with some limits. We should recognize and regulate MDPs
because of the impact of PwC and Deloitte in "striking first," as viewed
through the lens of "first-to-market" theories.310 This demonstrates how
the accountants have already gained a huge competitive advantage in the
national market for transactional legal and tax services. Further, the old
arguments about needing to prevent the proliferation of MDPs are now
stale: MDPs do exist; attempts to ignore them have failed to deter them.311
Now, we have global market actors prominently establishing them in the
corporate sector. Finally, if we recognize and regulate them, lawyers will
still have the opportunity to respond by leveraging the market monopoly
that they currently enjoy.
Lawyers in the United States should be able to provide legal services
under the MDP practice model because the need to stay competitive
globally with the Big Four accounting firms is more imperative than ever,
as the battle has now come to our shores.312 The impact of PwC and
Deloitte in "striking first" is demonstrated through a discussion of first-
to-market impact. In Lieberman and Montgomery's 1988 paper, First
Mover Advantages, they argue that companies who are "first movers" gain
three distinct advantages.33 First, the first mover has the advantage of
technological leadership, which means that the first mover can often
secure patent rights with valuable economic advantages, and that the first
mover will be able to use that advantage to continue to refine its product
or offering that is responsive to its market and ensuring continuing
customer satisfaction.314 Second, the first mover gains control over
resources, including cornering access points to the market or valuable
geographic locations that can only support one market actor.315 Finally,
310 Lieberman & Montgomery, supra note 17, at 41-42.
311 See supra Section II.C..
312 The battle has literally come to our shores-PwC's ILC is situated in Washington D.C. on
the East Coast, and Deloitte's law firm is situated in San Francisco on the West Coast.





the first mover has an advantage because it is simply inefficient and
inconvenient for a customer to switch a newer brand.316
While Lieberman and Montgomery also provide a thorough analysis
of the disadvantages of being the first mover and the advantages of being
a later mover,317 the longer the accountants are able to capitalize on these
advantages without any real competition from global legal players, the
longer they are able to build their market legitimacy and become the
dominant player in this type of multidisciplinary service offering. The
need to stay competitive and respond to this initial move is more
important than ever.
One feature of our regulatory framework that we can leverage is our
current control over the legal services market monopoly and the
attendant approval and accreditation process. As Ogus suggested, one
model of a competing market competition would be to have all potential
providers of a professional service submit their firms for approval to the
current regulator,38 which would then require some independent hird
party public agent to neutrally oversee the guidelines.319 In this instance,
because accountants do not have the authority to wholesale engage in the
practice of law, lawyers could use the legitimizing feature of our current
self-regulatory approval process to recognize, regulate, and develop best
standards and practices for firms with non-lawyer owners or directors.
Because of this approval and accreditation labeling, lawyers would be able
to market a higher quality, ABA and state-approved, ethical MDP to
potential corporate and small firm clients.
Because of its ability to market a higher quality product, allowing
MDPs would at least allow lawyers to shape the market for MDPs at elite
levels that would compete with the accountant majority controlled
MDPs. Whether we approve of the self-regulatory and market monopoly
legal system we current exist within or not, we can at least use our
monopoly on approval and accreditation to brand lawyer controlled
MDPs with the legitimizing feature of regulatory approval and regulation
in order to market a higher quality and less risky product to corporate
and small firm clients. The time has come to recognize these
developments and those innovative legal entrepreneurs by regulating
316 Id.
317 Id.
318 Ogus, supra note 15, at 104-05.
319 Id. at 106.
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MDPs or else we will continue to place the legal profession at a
competitive disadvantage. However, the longer that lawyers wait to
recognize and regulate MDPs, the more time the accountants will have to
refine their inter-professional services, collaborations, and client
efficiencies, further capturing solidifying its dominance in the global
MDP market. The accountants have already turned the tide; the lawyers
must be allowed to set sail or remain marooned on the beach indefinitely.
III. BLACK MARKET LAW FIRMS: A REGULATORY MODEL
Heresies are experiments in man's unsatisfied search for truth.
-H.G. Wells32°
By classifying, we create distinctions. Classifying along lines of
distinction allows us to make order out of chaos and highlight selected
distinguishing features.321 In attempts to classify MDPs, scholars have
used numerous definitions and classification systems to encompass the
multiverse of structural, organizational, and managerial permutations of
MDPs. Sometimes these classification methods are pure academic
ordering and attempt to clarify the scope and status of MDPs in a
descriptive and comparative manner. While each of these classification
methods shed clarity on different distinguishing features of MDPs, few
actually use the classifications to impact potential proposed legislation.
This Article proposes a new classification scheme for MDPs, which
either exempts them from classification (and thus strict regulation) or
classifies them as gray or black market MDPs, depending on their level of
risk of pressure on the lawyers involved to compromise their professional
independence. If the line of distinction is one of risk, then black market
MDPs are those that pose the most risk and those MDPs that are exempt
present little to no risk of compromises of lawyer independence. Under
this classification scheme, black market law firms would be MDPs with
non-lawyer majority ownership or control. The benefits of this new
classification scheme are that, in addition to providing a new clarifying
32u H.G. WELLS, CRUX ANSATA: AN INDICTMENT OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH 18
(Freethought Press 1953) (1943).




perspective, it also provides familiar and incentivizing language that can
only benefit lawyers-painting non-lawyer controlled MDPs in the
negative framing of an unregulated and unauthorized legal service
provider.
This new classification scheme also informs the proposed model for
recognizing and regulating MDPs, arguing for general non-proscriptive
legislation recognizing all forms of MDPs, including fully integrated
models. This Part then argues that proscriptive requirements should
work within the existing regulatory framework that lawyers currently
enjoy to restrict lawyer participation in non-lawyer controlled or owned
MDPs. This would allow the legal profession to recognize and offer MDP
forms that have lawyer majority ownership and control.
A. Regulatory Models
Scholars and commentators attempt to categorize MDPs using a
variety of systems and nomenclature. Most classify or divide MDPs based
essentially on their descriptions or types and how they are structured and
operate in the real world.322 These definitions distinguish types based on
ownership and control,323 on size,324 on integration level between
professionals,325 and on clientele.326 Some of these classifications are
purely explanatory, while others have larger implications in proposed
regulatory approaches. Scholars also propose a wide variety of proposed
regulatory solutions to address MDPs, ranging from allowing full fee-
sharing and nonlawyer ownership to allowing only "small" MDPs
composed of fewer than thirty professionals. 327
322 See, e.g., ABA State Status Studies, supra note 185.
323 See Powell, Flight from the Center, supra note 271, at 1452.
324 See Poser, supra note 30, at 130.
325 See Terry, Primer, supra note 25, at 889.
326 See Poser, supra note 30, at 130.
327 Id.
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1. Classification Schemes and Regulatory Approaches
The five prototypes previously discussed above distinguish MDPs
based on how they are structured and their level of integration.328
Similarly, most scholarly classifications follow this lead, dividing MDPs
based on their factual operations, such as based on the percentages of
lawyer versus nonlawyer ownership and control, size and clientele of the
MDP, and the level of integration of the nonlawyers into the legal entity.
The California Bar's Task Force on the study of MDPs published its
findings and recommendations during the early 2000s wave of MDP
study, and the publication repeatedly made a distinction between "pure
form" MDPs and those simply regarded as MDPs that are not "pure
form."329 A "pure form" MDP, according to the California Bar Task
Force, requires a fully integrated structure, where all professional services
are housed under the same entity. 330 This classification scheme, based on
pure versus impure MDPs, focuses solely on the level of integration of the
nonlawyer professionals. Under this definition, only the Fully Integrated
prototype would be considered a "pure form" MDP; all other prototypes
and MDPs with differing associational relationships with the nonlawyer
professionals are impure MDPs.
Other classifications focus on the level of control that lawyers in the
MDP have versus nonlawyer control. According to Powell, there are
"regular" MDPs and "irregular" or "non-regular" MDPs.331 According to
Powell, regular MDPs are those controlled by lawyers and irregular or
non-regular MDPs are controlled by non-lawyers.332 Powell further
explains that MDPs where lawyers are the ultimate decision makers over
legal issues facing clients, despite nonlawyers having the "penultimate"
authority for the overall MDP, should be considered regular MDPs and
328 Id.
329 THE STATE BAR OF CAL. TASK FORCE ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, REPORT AND
FINDINGS OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE (2001), http://www.calbar.ca.gov/portals/0/
documents/reports/2001 MDP-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YUF-2KML].
330 See ABA State Status Studies, supra note 185.
331 See Powell, Flight from the Center, supra note 271, at 1452; Burnele V. Powell, Looking Ahead
to the Alpha Jurisdiction: Some Considerations that the First MDP Jurisdiction Will Want to Think




regulated accordingly.333 Similarly, Terry, writing a comparative piece
about German MDP regulations, divides MDPs up into "lawyer
dominated" vs. "nonlawyer dominated" MDPs.334 The purpose of
focusing on control implicates the larger concerns about the effect of
nonlawyer MDP control and management on a "subordinate" attorney's
independent and professional judgment.335
One classification scheme has made some substantial permanent
ingress into the MDP debate lexicon and distinguishes "Wall Street
MDPs" from "Main Street MDPs."336 Terry is also credited with creating
this nomenclature back in 1999.337 This classification scheme focuses on
the clientele, whether they be well funded corporate clients or low- and
moderate-income clients, and separates MDPs into which sector they
primarily serve.338 Poser takes it a step further and argues that Main Street
MDPs should also be limited to thirty non-staff professionals, imposing
a size restriction. Poser provides that family law and estate planning are
often considered practices that a Main Street MDP could provide more
efficiently.339 The purpose of making this distinction between service
sectors was to point out the complete failure of the debates to address the
impact of the bans on Main Street MDPs and their clients.
For those scholars that do support the recognition and regulation of
MDPs, some use these definitions and classifications as a means to shape
their regulatory proposals. As Terry points out, ignoring MDPs and
trying to stop MDPs have proved fruitless endeavors; regulation is the
only option left.340 The scholarly regulatory proposals range from broad
authorization for MDPs to very limited authorization for Main Street
MDP;341 others focus on creating specialized procedures for judicial
certification and auditing of MDPs;342 still others suggest creating a
333 Powell, Flight from the Center, supra note 271, at 1452.
334 Laurel S. Terry, German MDPs: Lessons to Learn, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1547, 1609 (2000)
[hereinafter Terry, German MDPs].
335 Id. at 1621.
336 Poser, supra note 30, at 123; Terry, Primer, supra note 25, at 882.
337 Terry, Primer, supra note 25, at 882-83; Poser, supra note 30, at 97.
338 Poser, supra note 30, at 130.
339 Id. at 97.
340 Terry, Primer, supra note 25, at 920.
341 Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 35, at 89; Poser, supra note 30, at 130.
342 See Terry, Primer, supra note 25, at 932-34.
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separate regulatory scheme for MDPs centered around "entity
regulation" and not individual attorney regulation.343 Some of the MDP
definitions and classifications are essential to understanding these
proposals, while some have less utility in crafting a workable solution.
The first grouping of regulations ranges from broad authorization
for MDP structures to highly limited and regulated MDP structures.
Dzienkowski, in his written testimony before the ABA's MDP
Commission, argued that broad authorization for MDPs and broad rules
would allow for different types of MDPs to develop.B44 Within that broad
authorization, however, others suggest more particularized rules for
MDPs in which fee-sharing and ownership are in common with
nonlawyer professionals. Terry, after doing an intensive comparison to
Germany's MDP regulations, proposes that all forms of MDPs should be
allowed, including Fully Integrated MDPs, with no requirement that
there be a lawyer majority owner requirement,B45 and then proposes
specific rules for addressing confidentiality and conflicts of interest
concerns.3 46 To address ethics within the MDP, Terry proposes that (1)
MDPs should be banned from providing simultaneous legal and audit
services to the same clients;347 (2) Nonlawyers should comply with the
lawyers' rules of confidentiality with respect to information they learn in
the course of assisting the lawyer with legal issues, but not when the
disclosure has no connection to the legal services;348 and (3) Conflicts of
interest should be imputed firm-wide, unless the firm is not actually fully
integrated and the law firm is a separate entity from the accounting or
nonlawyer professional services offered.B49 She also proposes, like other
scholars, that there should be some sort of certification and audit process
343 See, e.g., Hadfield & Rhode, supra note 286, at 1208.
344 See Statement from John Dzienkowski, Professor, Univ. of Tex. Sch of Law, to Am. Bar Ass'n
Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice (Apr. 8, 1999), https://web.archive.org/web/
20060215121304/www.abanet.org/cpr/dzienkowski2.html [https://perma.cc/2SQ3-5HWT].
345 Terry, German MDPs, supra note 334, at 1611.
346 Id. at 1618-23.
347 Id. at 1616-17. This is the approach that PwC/ILC plans to take with respect to its legal and
auditing clients.
348 Id. at 1618.
349 Id. at 1620-21.
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for MDPs.350 She finally proposed that all MDPs, regardless of size, should
be subject to the same rules.351
These broad authorizations for MDPs are in stark contrast o those
that suggest that MDPs should be allowed only in certain highly
restrictive forms. Poser argues that only Main Street MDPs should be
recognized and regulated because the conflicts and independence threats
that face Wall Street MDPs are not present in small MDPs.352 For that
reason, "informed consent" from the client about the structure of the
MDP and its implications on the lawyers' confidentiality duties should be
enough to cover these concerns.353 She also suggests a ban on MDPs
selling goods or products to clients for which any of the professionals in
the MDP would receive a commission, like insurance policies or real
estate transactions.354 While she defines Main Street MDPs in terms of
the clientele that they serve-low- and moderate-income clients-she
defines and limits the MDP authorization to only those MDPs with thirty
or fewer professionals.355 This narrow authorization will allow Main
Street MDPs, she argues, to become testing grounds and "laboratories of
the future" for innovative legal services delivery.356 Like Terry, she also
suggests judicial regulation and certification of MDPs.357
Similar to Poser, Brustin argues that, if anything, the ABA should
clarify its Rules to allow "non-profit MDPs."358 Some of the language in
Model Rule 5.4 suggests that it applies to lawyers practicing for a profit,
but disagreement exists over whether the partnership prohibition also in
Rule 5.4 precludes non-profits from forming MDPs, regardless of their
profit generating and potential fee-sharing activities. Brustin argued that
non-profit MDPs, often synonymous with Main Street MDPs, "have
demonstrated ethical viability and practical benefits."359
350 Id. at 1619.
351 Id. at 1623.
352 Poser, supra note 30, at 102-03.
353 Id. at 130.
354 Id.
355 Id.
356 Id. at 97.
357 Id. at 104.
358 Brustin, supra note 14, at 4.
359 Poser, supra note 30, at 116 (citing Brustin, supra note 14, at 4).
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The audit or certification requirement is akin to other suggestions
that MDPs appoint special MDP counsel or MDP independent directors.
As Terry points out, her research on German MDPs leads her to
recommend certification and auditing of MDPs.360 Matheson and
Favorite proposed in 2001 that MDPs should employ independent
directors because "[i]ndependent directors have proven their value to
corporation's shareholders by serving as watchdogs over their
investment."361 Similarly, independent legal directors of MDPs would
ensure the MPD is operating ethically in order to protect clients from any
issues of confidentiality, conflicts of interest, and lawyer independence. 362
Some scholars also argue that, like in France and Germany, the Rules
of Professional Conduct should regulate the MDP entity and not the
individual attorneys involved in the MDP.363 This proposal seems
controversial, as other scholars, such as Harrison, argue that the "goal
should be to assert ethical regulation over all attorneys offering legal
services, regardless of the economic or organizational structure of their
business."364 The possibility of entity regulation, instead of individual
attorney regulation, is similar to the D.C. requirement now that
nonlawyers in the MDP have to abide by the lawyers' ethical rules,
especially with respect to confidentiality and conflicts of interest.365
2. Analysis of Classification and Regulatory Schemes
While the classification and regulatory proposals have certainly
driven the MDP debate forward, and it is probable that many of the
proposals would result in efficient regulation of MDPs in a manner that
preserves the lawyer's duties of independence, confidentiality, and
avoiding conflicts of interest, it is too difficult to capture the full panoply
of potential methods for organizing and operating an MDP by focusing
on classification types based on factual MDP forms. All of the
classifications presented further depend on some factual description of
360 Terry, German MDPs, supra note 334, at 1619.
361 Matheson & Favorite, supra note 286, at 610.
362 Id. at611.
363 See Terry, German MDPs, supra note 334, at 1623.
364 Harrison, Multidisciplinary Practices, supra note 287, at 920-21.
365 D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.4 (D.C. BAR ASS'N 2015).
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the MDP that unifies all other MDPs with that same characteristic,
despite other structural or organizational differences that may exist
within each defined class.366 Some of these classifications also reflect snap
shots along the timeline of MDP understanding and growth and make
less sense in today's MDP landscape.367 Further, not all of the
classifications have much utility outside of providing clarifying
explanations, and these classifications do little in terms of setting up a
platform for potential regulation.
The "pure" versus "impure" monikers, in which only MDPs that are
fully integrated and operate under a single entity are considered "pure,"
are helpful in distinguishing the entity or affiliation method of different
MDPs.368 But the "impure" label essentially refers to every other type of
MDP that does not operate under a single entity and in that regard is a
bit broad. The "regular" versus "irregular" or "non-regular" MDP labels,
which refer to MDPs that are controlled by lawyers versus ones that are
controlled by nonlawyer professions, respectively,369 is helpful for
pointing out potential additional regulatory rules that might apply to
nonlawyer controlled MDPs; it is the label itself that is problematic.
Irregular MDPs are meant to refer to those not controlled by lawyers, and
this author is not convinced that nonlawyer-controlled (i.e., accountant
owned) MDPs are the exception, instead of the new norm. Again, without
hard empirical data to determine the proliferation of lawyer owned and
controlled MDPs versus nonlawyer owned and controlled MDPs,370 it is
hard to ignore the impact of the Big Four accounting firms' utilization of
MDPs and to continue to call those industry MDPs "irregular."
Further, in reality, there may not be a meaningful lawyer majority
versus nonlawyer majority. Some small firm MDPs may have one
attorney working alongside one social worker or one other accountant. If
the goals of these MDPs is to respect the contributions and positive
impact of collective client representation,371 then forcing MDPs into a
situation where they are either lawyer controlled or not may be anathema
366 See infra Section 11.A.
367 See Powell, Flight from the Center, supra note 271, at 1452-53.
368 See Paton, Redux, supra note 147, at 2226-27.
369 Powell, Flight from the Center, supra note 271, at 1452-53.
37U See Poser, supra note 30, at 133.
371 Id. at 109.
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to the underlying practical structure and purposes behind why some of
these professionals in MDPs choose to associate.
The most beneficial but also the most theoretically problematic is
the "Wall Street" versus "Main Street" MDP classification. The main crux
of the Wall Street/Main Street classification is the clientele and the
potential size of the MDP. Main Street lawyers are simply described as
"lawyers practicing in smaller communities or smaller firms."372 Wall
Street MDPs are described as "large business organizations such as
accounting firms or banks hiring lawyers to give legal advice to their large
corporate and business clients."373 Presumably and implicit in that
description is that the client work will lower dollar in value and will
include non-profit collaborative MDPs as well. Focusing on the
community and the clientele is problematic, however, because there is no
theoretical reason to treat either type of client differently from the
lawyer's perspective and with respect to, again, the three things essentially
at stake here, confidentiality, conflicts, and independence.
This classification becomes even more problematic when
considering the types of services both Wall Street and Main Street MDPs
would provide. As a review of Dzienkowski's Clearspire model shows, for
example, a Wall Street MDP like Clearspire provides both litigation and
transactional services, in addition to its consulting and technology
consulting arm.374 Clearspire's legal services encompass the democratic
function of law and the economic function of law. Similarly, many
smaller MDPs that serve low income or pro bono clients also operate in
both representational spheres. While the market impact of Wall Street
and Main Street MDPs will differ and smaller firms might actually
present fewer ethical risks to lawyer independence, this author is not
convinced, along with Terry, that MDPs should be categorized and
distinguished based on size.375 This author also finds no basis for limiting
MDP recognition to only small firms with thirty or fewer professionals.
That distinction really addresses control, as Wall Street MDPs are known
as those Big Four accounting firm-style MDPs in which accountants
outnumber and outrank the attorneys.
372 Terry, Primer, supra note 25, at 882.
373 Poser, supra note 30, at 96.
374 Dzienkowski, supra note 14, at 3002-03.
375 Terry, German MDPs, supra note 334, at 1623.
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B. Gray and Black Market Law Firms
While these previous categorizations are insightful and explanatory,
this Article argues that we should craft categories or classifications of
MDP models along lines of risk, classifying MDPs as either white, gray,
or black market law firms based on the percentage of majority and
minority control of non-lawyer owners and managers, specifically in the
context of fully integrated MDPs. This approach reframes how to classify
MDPs because it does not focus on describing the factual realities of the
myriad of different MDP forms, but instead focuses on the permissible or
impermissible risks of pressure to subvert a lawyer's independent
judgment. The rhetorical impact of additionally labeling non-lawyer
majority controlled MDPs as "black market" also assists the legal
profession's move into the regulated MDP space because it negatively
labels the current accountant-controlled MDPs in a negative light.
By focusing on the degree of non-lawyer ownership and control-
the real risk at stake in both maintaining the lawyer's legal market and
maintaining the lawyer's independence-we can craft a regulatory
solution that addresses those risks.
1. Definition
Black's Law Dictionary defines "black market" as "[a]n illegal market
for goods that are controlled or prohibited by the government, such as
the underground market for prescription drugs."3 76 The definition
provided also refers the information seeker to the term "shadow
economy," which Black's Law defines as "[c]ollectively, the unregistered
economic activities that contribute to a country's gross national product.
A shadow economy may involve the legal and illegal production of goods
and services, including gambling, prostitution, and drug-dealing, as well
as barter transactions and unreported incomes.-Also termed black
economy; black market; underground economy."377 Black markets can
become lucrative for their proprietors because enough consumers exist
who wish to "evade restrictive government price controls or inconvenient
376 Market, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11 th ed. 2019).
377 Shadow Economy, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11 th ed. 2019).
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rationing schemes, to avoid paying heavy taxes on the good or service in
question, or simply to be able to obtain forbidden goods or services that
the government prohibits consumers from purchasing."378
Relatedly, the gray market refers to an industry in which the goods
or services offered are partly authorized by the regulatory powers, but
some aspects of the good or service provided are illegal. Black's Law
Dictionary defines "gray market" as "[a] market in which the seller uses
legal but sometimes unethical methods to avoid a manufacturer's
distribution chain and thereby sell goods (esp. imported goods) at prices
lower than those envisioned by the manufacturer."379 Often used in the
context of importing foreign goods, a popular focus in the 1980s,380 the
gray market however also refers more generally to an industry for goods
and services in which the good or service is authorized or legal under
certain regulatory schemes, but not in the manner or distribution method
employed by the good or service provider.381 Cambridge English
Dictionary, for example, defines "the gray market" as "an unofficial but
not completely illegal system in which products are bought and sold[.]"382
2. Application
Applying these definitions in the context of structural and
operational features of MDPs, this Article introduces a new
categorization method that classifies MDPs according to their
compliance with current ethical rules and a realistic framework for
378 Black Market Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM, https://definitions.uslegal.com/b/
black-market [https://perma.cc/9RTW-F9MZ].
379 Gray market, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11 th ed. 2019).
380 See, e.g., Nancy K. Dahl, Comment, Grey Market Imports: Stemming the Tide, 65 OR. L. REV.
123,123 (1986); Randall J. Towers, Comment, Copiat v. United States, The Grey Market Gets Greyer,
14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 107,107-09 (1989).
381 See Margaret Rouse, Gray Market, WHATIS.COM, http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/
gray-market [https://perma.cc/CYV5-ZM2W] ("The term gray market reflects the somewhat
ambiguous middle-ground between the completely legal products sold on the white market and the
clearly illegal products sold on the black market.").
382 The Grey Market, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/
english/grey-market [https://perma.cc/VW2B-X6MT]. The Macmillan Dictionary defines "grey
market" as "the business of secretly buying and selling goods in a way that is not illegal but that is





addressing instance which risk subverting lawyer independence. Despite
the current ethical rules banning all partnerships between lawyers and
nonlawyers and banning fee sharing between lawyers and nonlawyers,
lawyers and non-lawyers frequently engage in collaborations and
partnerships across the full spectrum of MDP forms and have managed
to develop internal processes to maintain their ethical obligations to
clients, delivering holistic professional services where the legal services
are managed and controlled by lawyers.
a. Ownership or Control
With this framework in mind, this Article posits that MDPs should
be categorized as either gray or black market MDPs in accordance with
the following contours:
* Black market. Non-lawyer majority ownership or control,
regardless of whether legal services are managed exclusively
by lawyers, under a fully integrated model or command and
control model.
* Gray market. Lawyer majority owned and controlled, and
legal services are managed exclusively by lawyers, under a
fully integrated model or command and control model.
Exempted from the classification scheme altogether are MDP forms
that fall short of full integration, such as those based upon a contract
model, strategic alliance model, or ancillary business model. The focus of
the proposed classification scheme specifically zeros in on practice forms
housed within a single partnership or entity, and addresses ownership or
control majorities that could compromise a lawyer's duty of professional
independence, avoiding conflicts of interest, and maintaining
confidentiality. Therefore, any fully integrated MDP in which non-
lawyers hold a majority percentage of the ownership and control of the
MDP would be classified as a black market law firm because such an
ownership dynamic presents the most risk that a lawyer employed by or
a minority interest owner of the MDP would be more susceptible to
compromises of integrity. Where there is a risk that a law firm could
become "captive" to non-lawyer owners, then such a risk would push that
particular MDP into black market territory.
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Gray market MDPs, much like their colloquial definitions imply, are
MDPs in which lawyers and non-lawyers may partner together, but they
do so in a way that does not potentially lead to a strong risk that the
lawyers involved in the MDP would compromise their ethical duties.
Gray market MDPs could thus be fully integrated MDPs where lawyers
and non-lawyers both share control and ownership, but where lawyers
retain majority ownership and control and there is no possibility of that
percentage dynamic flipping to non-lawyer majority control. Lawyers
would, of course, be required to maintain their independence on
overseeing legal advice to clients. The Slater & Gordon initial public
offering in Australia, for example, resulted in an MDP where the original
partner-shareholders owned 77.5 million shares in the firm.383 They sold
17.3 million of those original partner-shares and issued 17.7 million new
shares, all of which were acquired by professional and institutional
investors.34 At the close of the offering, the original partner-shareholders
held sixty-three percent of the voting rights, where outside investors held
thirty-seven percent.385 In this example, the Slater & Gordon MDP would
be a gray market MDP because lawyers still retain majority ownership
and control over nonlawyer institutional investors.
The D.C. command and control model is included because of the
structure of such a model still allows non-lawyers to have ownership of
and managerial authority over a legal services entity, existing within an
otherwise integrated partnership or entity.386
Whether or not a lawyer and a non-lawyer are operating as an MDP
should also be based not only on those who formally choose to register as
an MDP, but also on common law factors that inform our definition of a
"partnership," as the current Rule 5.4 does. Therefore, if a fully integrated
partnership between a lawyer, a lobbyist, and an economist in which all
parties agree to operate together, sharing fees, and otherwise holding
themselves out to the public as being a partnership or association, then
default partnership rules would impose that each would be a 1/3 owner,
383 Milton C. Regan, Jr., Lawyers, Symbols, and Money: Outside Investment in Law Firms, 27
PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 407, 412 (2008); Justin D. Petzold, Comment, Firm Offers: Are Publicly
Traded Law Firms Abroad Indicative of the Future of the United States Legal Sector?, 2009 Wis. L.
REv. 67.
384 Regan, supra note 9, at 412.
385 Id.
386 See D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.4 (2015).
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putting the nonlawyer ownership as the majority ownership block. As
such, the default rules would push this MDP model into the black market
MDP space. To remedy this characterization, the partners would need to
disassociate and collaborate via contract.
These new classification schemes thus focus on the level of risk that
non-lawyer ownership or control could subvert or influence a lawyer's
duty to provide independent and professional judgment and otherwise
hold lawyers "captive" to the wishes of the non-lawyers. This
classification, which makes a distinction along the percentage of
ownership in or control over the MDP between lawyer majority
controlled and non-lawyer majority controlled MDPs, reflects Germany's
current approach to regulated MDP entities, which makes some
distinctions along these lines as well, as well as the earliest MDP
regulations adopted by Australia in 1994 which required lawyers to retain
fifty-one percent ownership over the MDP, although this rule has now
been lifted.387 This recommended rule is more liberal and flexible than
limitations in other jurisdictions, which restrict nonlawyer ownership to
twenty-five percent, for example, or require all nonlawyer owners to be
silent partners with no voting power.388 This fifty-one percent rule also
simply favors lawyers over nonlawyers in an attempt to leverage its
licensing and practice of law monopoly to remain competitive, in
addition to attempting to assuage fears about client ethical obligations.
Therefore, the fifty-one percent rule is somewhat of a compromise that
balances growth and innovation with competitiveness and protecting
client interests.
b. Non-Considerations: Non-Integration, Non-Profit Status
This classification scheme both chooses to emphasize ownership
and control, as opposed to other considerations, such as the non-profit
or for-profit status of the enterprise.
Exempted from the classification scheme are those MDPs which fall
short of full integration or single association, such as those based on the
Contract Model, the Strategic Alliance Model, or the Ancillary Business
Model. For example, a contract-based referral system between an
individual lawyer, social worker, and financial planner in which all
387 See Terry, Primer, supra note 25, at 923; MARK ET AL., supra note 201.
388 SOLICITORS CODE OF CONDUCT r. 14.01(3) (LAw SOC'Y CODE 2007)
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professionals operated individually would be exempt from classification
as either a gray or black market law firm. By exempting such contract-
based or referral based relationships from regulation, we provide lawyers
and nonlawyer professionals with the freedom to collaborate and
determine the terms of their relationship according to a negotiated
contract or agreement. These exempted relationships also presuppose
that the professionals will operate in a less-than-fully integrated model,
so that fee-sharing, ownership, and control issues are not implicated.
This classification scheme also makes no distinction between for-
profit and non-profit fully integrated MDPs. In other words, while co-
ownership issues are theoretically not present in non-profit MDPs,
management and board control still are. For example, an individual
lawyer might be working with a group of four professional social workers
and two psychologists, all of whom are on the board of the MDP. One
could imagine that a lawyer, despite having written safeguards or
protocol in place to attempt to maintain lawyer independence, might still
succumb to the voting power and influence of the nonlawyer board
majority on issues that might not be in a client's best legal interests. One
could imagine still that such pressure upon a lawyer's professional
independence would be compounded when employed or working on a
board of a larger non-profit MDP equal in size to a Goodwill or Red
Cross, for example. For this reason, the classification makes no
distinction between non-profit MDPs and for-profit MDPs, and instead
focuses on, in the case of non-profit MDPs, the percentage of control.
C. Proposed Regulatory Approach
This Article argues that lawyers should amend Rule 5.4 to allow both
non-lawyer ownership and fee-sharing between lawyers and non-lawyers
in an MDP setting. In general, Rule 5.4 should be generally non-
proscriptive, allowing lawyers to associate with nonlawyers in a multitude
of ways and across different industries in order to promote innovation
and collaboration in multidisciplinary professional services delivery and
payment schemes and allowing professionals the space to negotiate and
establish fee-sharing and investment opportunities to support their
collaborative practices.
Using the previously delineated classifications, this proposed
regulatory approach prohibits lawyers from offering legal services in a
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black market law firm, or an MDP in which nonlawyers enjoy a majority
ownership or control interest in the firm. While gray market law firms,
or MDPs in which lawyers maintain majority ownership and control,
would be authorized, such firms would need to register with their
respective state's bar association, appoint a legal manager assigned to
oversee ethical issues within the firm who must attend a training on
ethical issues within an MDP setting, and requiring the MDP to submit a
conflicts of interest and confidentiality plan specific to their professional
collaboration types when registering. All lawyers in an MDP setting
would be required to provide notice and informed consent to
representation by an MDP to its legal clients.
1. Non-Proscriptive Ethical Rule
Like other scholarly recommendations, this Article argues that the
ABA should amend Rule 5.4 and revise the language that prohibits fee
sharing and partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers. This move
would incentivize more states to lift their individual bans as well and
perhaps cause D.C. to expand upon its limited rule. The regulation
authorizing MDPs should also be broad and non-proscriptive, meaning
the authorization should not prohibit different types of associational
forms, fee-sharing forms, or nonlawyer management or ownership. The
attorneys and professionals involved should, following the trend in
innovations in legal services delivery, be allowed to structure and
associate with one another in any manner they find sufficient, including
under a fully integrated model.
The authorization should be broader than D.C.'s rules, which allows
for a limited form of MDP, because, as Poser has pointed out, D.C.'s strict
authorization has "not lead to an influx" of MDP operations in the area.389
Because those rules are so limiting, those practitioners that are wary of
operating outside of the rules of professional conduct opt not to form
MDPs at all.390 A general non-proscriptive regulation that allows for the
operation of MDPs would thus recognize the positive and beneficial
contributions of MDPs for all clientele, thus encouraging the continued
389 Daly, supra note 14, at 244.
390 Id. at 129.
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development of innovative and collaborative professional services
delivery without fear of retribution or sanction by state ethics boards.
Also in contrast to the D.C. rule, the MDP should not need to have,
as its "sole purpose," the delivery of legal services.391 Again, the D.C.
requirement subordinates the role of the nonlawyer professionals
involved and makes the MDP resemble a traditional law firm structure.
If the "sole purpose" of the MDP has to be the delivery of legal services,
then any work the nonlawyer professional does must be in furtherance of
completing and addressing the client's legal issues.
Enlarging the purposes allowed for authorized MDPs would also
recognize the potential for market growth that adding a nonlegal
department can bring to the MDP and the lawyers involved. One of the
benefits of an MDP is that it attracts more clients with diverse legal needs
because such clients might only seek the assistance of the MDP initially
for its financial planning or engineering services and then will later
employ the legal services offered afterward understanding the full scope
of his or her professional needs. What if a client further only wants
financial planning or consulting services from the MDP and may have no
discreet legal tasks? The purpose of the MDP should be to serve all the
professional needs of the client, not just the legal ones.
Additionally, the D.C. rule specifically limits the participation of
non-lawyers to "individual [s]," excluding other business entities, such as
accounting firms, consulting firms, or medical practices, from
participating in the D.C. MDP model.392 This aims at preventing a law
firm from creating and MDP with an accounting firm, for example,
because of the implicit fears about lawyers becoming "captive" to the
accounting firm, as some argue they have become for insurance
companies.393 However, a revised Rule 5.4 should not limit nonlawyer
participants to individuals, allowing individual and entity partners, as
well as allowing institutional or entity partners solely for investment
purposes.394 A revised rule regulation should allow business entities to
provide capital to law firms in exchange for equity, as long as there are
other safeguards in place to protect the core values of the profession and
lawyer control over the delivery of the legal services. Allowing entity non-
391 See D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.4 (2015).
392 Id.
393 See generally Terry, Primer, supra note 25, at 927-28; Yarbrough, supra note 29, at 659.
394 But see Administration of Justice Act (1985) § 9A (UK).
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lawyer owners would also allow firms more flexibility and creativity in
their strategies for raising capital and remaining competitive in an
increasingly global legal and professional services market.
The prohibition on partnerships and fee-sharing between lawyers
and non-lawyers should thus be removed from the ethical restrictions
and replaced with general language that allows lawyers to both share fees
and share ownership with non-lawyers.
2. Limitations-Regulating for Risks and Outcomes
In order to address how to regulate for risks and to leverage the
existing regulatory framework in order to promote lawyer
competitiveness and legal business innovation, the ethical rules should
impose the following limitations or requirements onto MDPs:
a. Exempted MDPs
MDPs in which lawyers associate with nonlawyer professionals
either through a formal contract, referral system, or strategic alliance, but
that otherwise fall short of a partnership or full integration are not subject
to specialized regulation, but instead are required to provide notice to
clients on the nature of the contractual relationship between the lawyer
and nonlawyer as well as to obtain the client's informed consent as to the
nature of that relationship, including the disclosure of any fee-sharing.
This rule is similar to the notice and disclosure requirement in Model
Rule 5.7, which regulates a lawyer's ancillary business or the provision of
"law-related services."395 Best practices would also implore lawyers and
professionals involved to reduce their negotiated relationship into
writing so as to avoid the default imposition of business partnership rules,
which could create a situation in which two individual professionals who
intend to remain separate sole proprietors, for example, but who offer a
good or service for profit would be conscripted into a default partnership
relationship under common law rules.396
395 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.7 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020).
396 See, e.g., UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 101(6) (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 1997) ("[A]n association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners [of] a
business for profit formed under Section 202, predecessor law, or comparable law of another
jurisdiction").
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Therefore, if a lawyer wanted to establish a referral and fee-sharing
relationship with an accountant and a business consultant, the lawyer
should form a contractual relationship or strategic alliance which
establishes that the relationship is not a partnership, but contractual and
limited in nature. The lawyer would also need, upon engaging with a new
client, to obtain the client's informed consent to being represented by a
lawyer with a referral or contractual relationship with a non-lawyer, the
nature of the relationship, which services each professional offers, the
confidentiality and conflicts rules that apply, and the fee-sharing and
payment scheme established.
b. Gray Market Law Firms
While firms that retain lawyer ownership and control over the MDP
should be authorized under a revised statutory scheme, such
authorization should come with some restrictions and protocols to
protect the lawyer's client. In addition to requiring that lawyers retain the
majority ownership and control over an MDP, the rule should also
require that the MDP:
Register as an MDP with the state attorney regulatory
authority.397 Although the ABA and state bar associations
are currently structured to regulate individual attorneys,
setting up an administrative infrastructure that allows
attorneys operating an MDP to register as such could be
relatively perfunctory. Similar to "checking the box" in pre-
filled state Articles of Incorporation or Articles of
Organization, for example,398 MDPs could submit the
397 See also UK Legal Services Act (2007) Part 5 (creating the Solicitor's Regulation Authority).
398 See, e.g., DOMESTIC LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC) CERTIFICATE OF FORMATION
(2015), https://www.sos.alabama.gov/sites/default/files/form-files/sosdf-8.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4FD4-ZDS4] (Alabama form). Similarly, in New South Wales, the OLSC developed a standard self-
assessment document to allow legal service providers to assess the appropriateness of their
management systems. This document takes into account the size, work practices, and nature of
operations of the entity. The legal practitioner rates the entity's compliance with each of ten
objectives as either "fully compliant plus," "fully compliant," "compliant," "partially compliant," or
"non-compliant," which the legal practitioner then sends to the OLSC for review. Christine Parker
et al., Regulating Law Firms Ethics Management: An Empirical Assessment of an Innovation in
Regulation of the Legal Profession in New South Wales, 37 J.L. & Soc'Y 466, 474 (2010).
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necessary demographic and ownership information to attest
to its status as lawyer majority owned and control.
To address the administrative costs of maintaining such a
repository, the regulatory authority could charge a simple filing fee.
* Appoint a Legal Manager.399 As other jurisdictions have
adopted,400 a revised rule should require that the MDP
appoint a Legal Manager, who is responsible for ethical
compliance of the MDP and is otherwise the agent for the
MDP with respect to regulatory interference. The Legal
Manager could also be required to attend an ethics
workshop or CLE in order to ensure he or she understands
and adequately address that heightened ethical risks
inherent in owning and operating an MDP.
* Adopt and submit a conflicts and ethics policy.401 In addition
to naming the Legal Manager in the registration document,
the MDP would also need to adopt and file a Conflicts of
Interest and Ethics Policy sufficient to address the particular
ethical issues in the registrant's MDP. Similar to the IRS's
requiring those who are applying for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt
status to adopt and submit with its application a sufficient
conflicts of interest policy,402 this requirement would force
MDP owners and managers to address the ethical issues,
adopt a policy that conforms with sample best practices,403
and submit hose documents as public records.
399 See MARK ET AL., supra note 201, at 5.
400 See id. at 5 (discussing New South Wales legislation requiring an MDP must appoint a legal-
practitioner director); Matheson & Favorite, supra note 286, at 610.
40U1 See MARK ET AL., supra note 201, at 6-7 ("[T]he OLSC has also encouraged law firms who
want to attract external investment... to preserve the ethics of legal practice by explicitly stating
[so] in the prospectus, constituent documents[,] and shareholder agreements .... ).
402 Form 1023: Purpose of Conflict of Interest Policy, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-
profits/form- 1023-purpose-of-conflict-of-interest-policy [https://perma.cc/8NFE-NF4S] (last
updated Dec. 20, 2019).
403 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1023, at 25 app.
A (2020), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1023.pdf [https://perma.cc/9K7L-PXR5].
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* Include a hierarchy of ethical and client obligations in the
organizational or operational documents.404 The MDP
should also insert into either its formation document or
operational document language enshrining the hierarchy of
ethical obligations owed by the MDP to its clients.405 Such a
requirement is similar to language requirements in public
benefit corporations or social enterprises that subjugate or
equalize a director and officer's fiduciary duty for profit
maximization with a social impact or public purpose duty as
well.406
* Submit an annual report. Like most registered entities, the
MDP should be required to submit an annual report,
attesting to its status as lawyer majority owned and
controlled.407
* Obtain the client's informed consent as to the MDP nature of
the firm.408 Finally, in addition to the formational and
registration requirements, upon engaging with a client to
represent him or her in legal or nonlegal matters, the MDP
must obtain the client's informed consent as to the nature of
the MDP, specifically consenting to the being counseled on
the MDPs policies for confidentiality, conflicts of interest,
and fee-sharing. Obtaining the client's informed consent is
similar to the requirement in Rule 5.7 that requires a client's
consent when receiving services from a lawyer's ancillary
business.409
c. Black Market MDPs
While the default rule would be that MDPs in which nonlawyers
enjoy majority ownership and control are not authorized under the legal
404 See MARK ET AL., supra note 201, at 5-6.
4U5 See id. at 5-6.
4U6 Joseph W. Yockey, Does Social Enterprise Law Matter?, 66 ALA. L. REv. 767, 781-82 (2015);
see Public Benefit Corporation Act of Colorado, H.R. 1138, 2013 Gen. Assemb. (Colo. 2013), as
amended by H.R. 1200,2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017).
407 See, e.g., PERIODIC REPORT (2010), https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/business/sampleForms/
REPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/XDS8-TPYA] (Colorado form).
408 Poser, supra note 30, at 130.
409 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.7 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020).
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ethical rules, if nonlawyers and lawyers wanted to work together and offer
professional services under a fully integrated model, then they would be
required to organize in such a way that the lawyers retain majority
ownership percentages and full control over the management of legal
services, even if the nonlawyers outnumber the lawyers. Therefore, in a
previous example in which a lawyer works together with a lobbyist and
an economist, the professionals would need to organize in such a way that
the lawyer owned at least fifty-one percent of the MDP and fifty-one
percent of the voting interest. Larger, corporate MDPs which main
offerings are professional services in addition to legal services would be
barred, making exceptions for in-house counsel-type relationships.
While the accountant-backed MDPs might skirt this rule by continuing
to hide under the guise of "practicing tax," restricting the offering of legal
services to lawyer owned MDPs at least gives lawyers the opportunity to
grow to scale in their provision of more distinct legal services in tandem
with other professional services.
Proscriptive limitations in the revised ethical rules would thus
prevent lawyers from practicing in black market MDPs and instead
authorize practice forms in which lawyers will maintain the ownership
and voting majorities. By only authorizing gray market MDPs, the
proscriptions would essentially cast black market MDPs as unregulated,
offering potential clients of the MDP services model a riskier, potentially
lesser quality product, implying by the strength of the "black market"
rhetoric that non-lawyer controlled MDPs should be avoided. Further, by
legitimizing and regulating gray market MDPs, the legal profession has
the opportunity to utilize the branding function of its licensure monopoly
to market and provide a higher quality, more ethically sound MDP,410 not
subject to risks of economic capture and ruin which besieged Arthur
Anderson in the Enron collapse.411 By leveraging its ability to offer a
licensed MDP practice form, the legal profession can not only learn from
the traditional "mistakes" that often plague "first movers," but ensure that
it remains competitive on a larger scale with encroaching accounting
firms and encourages innovation at elite practice levels.
410 See supra Section L.A.
411 See supra Section II.B.2.c.
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d. Proposed Hierarchy of Ethical Obligations
As part of its requirements, a revised Rule 5.4 should require MDPs
to encode in its organizational or operational documents (whether it be
its Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws, Partnership Agreement, or
Operating Agreement), a hierarchy of ethical obligations to clients that
protects the lawyer's duties of confidentiality, avoiding conflicts of
interest, and maintaining independence.
The issue within this space is to determine to what extent the rules
for confidentiality and conflicts of interest should apply to the
nonlawyers involved in the MDP. Terry provides the most detailed and
comprehensive scheme for dealing with this particular issue. Her solution
is to propose that nonlawyers in the MDP should be subject to the same
conflicts of interest rules as the lawyers, so conflicts would be imputed
throughout the entire firm.412 Akin to that, Terry suggests that if the MDP
also provides auditing services, that the MDP should not offer auditing
and legal services to the same organization. This, of course, is how PwC's
ILC Legal is attempting to address the conflicts of interest provision in its
MDP, but prohibiting ILC Legal to provide legal services to any clients
that also receive auditing services from PwC.413 414
This author agrees with Terry that conflicts should be imputed to
the entire MDP, especially if the MDP is fully integrated under one entity
type.415 This author also understands Terry's hesitation to include an
imputation rule if the MDP is not fully integrated and operates as two
separate entities.416 In that instance, the conflicts of interest rules should
not necessarily be imputed to the other professionals involved in an
MDP, especially considering the nature of the legal work that the legal
arm of the MDP might be providing. For example, if the lawyers in a non-
fully integrated MDP provide transactional legal services to an
organizational client, such as assisting with forming and entity and
drafting organization and operational documents such as bylaws or an
412 Terry, German MDPs, supra note 334, at 1620.
413 See Bruch, supra note 7.
414 See cf Terry, German MDPs, supra note 334, at 1594 (discussing how lawyers, accountants,
and tax advisors in Germany are subject to the same obligation of confidentiality and privilege as
attorneys).




operating agreement, the conflicts of interest imputation rules should not
prevent the same client from going down the hall or down the street to
the financial and consulting arm of the MDP to receive counseling on
financial packages or marketing strategies. If the financial and consulting
arm is also providing auditing services, then this might be an instance in
which imputation might occur, but only for auditing, not for other
professional services. Here, this is an instance in which bifurcating the
dual functions of law could provide different rules for conflicts.417 This
imputation rule should apply, for example, if the legal arm is providing
democratic services, such as assisting domestic abuse victims, it might be
anathema for the social worker arm to provide counseling, for example,
to both the victim and the victim's abuser together. Without that
bifurcation, however, the imputation rules should apply only in fully
integrated MDPs and only when the nonlawyer arm in a bifurcated MDP
entity provides auditing services.
As to the confidentiality rules, Terry argues that nonlawyers should
be subject to the lawyer's confidentiality rules only if they are assisting the
lawyer in providing legal services.418 Here, this author disagrees with
Terry and takes quite the opposite approach. Where Terry thinks a
confidentiality duty should not apply unless the nonlawyer is assisting
with legal matters,419 this author argues that the confidentiality duty of
lawyers should apply to all professionals involved in a fully integrated
MDP unless those professionals have an alternative, positive reporting
duty, such as social workers.420 Accountants providing financial or
consulting services in an MDP with lawyers, for example, should be
subject to the same confidentiality rules as the lawyers out of protection
for the client.
This would have two effects: it would impose a duty of
confidentiality on all professionals involved and would extend the
confidentiality protection to all professional services received, including
legal and nonlegal. From a theoretical standpoint, one could also argue
that every decision an individual will make, whether it be personal or in
business, is somehow law-related or has legal effects.421 In that regard,
417 See supra Section LB.
418 Terry, German MDPs, supra note 334, at 1618-19.
419 Id.
42U See Peters, supra note 276, at 15.
421 See TRACY A. CINOCCA, CAREERS IN THE LAW: SUCCESS WITHOUT COLLEGE 150 (2001).
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lawyers working with nonlawyers in an MDP setting will naturally and by
design be assisting with related issues. It makes more sense to treat the
entirety of the information disclosed confidential, regardless of how
directly it relates to the legal services provided. Further, clients who seek
assistance from Main Street MDPs or smaller firm MDPs in which only
two or three professionals may be affiliated would likely expect that their
disclosures about their personal issues, even if unrelated to the direct legal
services delivery, should be kept secret by nature of the close interactions
between professionals involved in a Main Street MDP.
Further, extending the confidentiality requirement to all
professionals involved in the MDP extends the reach of the potential
regulatory agencies to regulate the nonlawyers involved in MDPs if the
rules are not amended to provide for MDP entity regulation. It also
reflects the reality of how the professionals working together would
interact. It would be difficult to ask the attorney not to disclose
confidential information to an accountant, for example, in discussing the
client's matter without destroying the confidentiality and attorney-client
privilege.422 To prevent the destruction of confidentiality, the nonlawyer
professionals should also be covered by those confidentiality rules.
D. Counterarguments
The author does acknowledge that this regulatory approach is not
without its potential weaknesses. As acknowledged, this regulatory
proposal is still existing within a broken system that is unbalanced and
can deter innovation. While a better solution may be a whole sale revision
of the ethical rules, which changes the approach and perspective in order
to account for certain unifying features of the profession as well as some
segmented features and differing lawyering tasks,423 this regulatory
proposal at least chips away at some of the monopolistic and conflating
aspects of the legal profession's self-regulatory system by introducing
almost unrestricted practice forms and collaboration structures between
lawyers and nonlawyers.
Another potential shortcoming of this proposal is the required
regulatory oversight required to ensure ethical compliance on two levels.
422 But cf Terry, German MDPs, supra note 334, at 1621.
423 See Remus, supra note 135, at 1273-79.
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First, Ogus argued that in self-regulatory systems where one profession
enjoys a monopoly, like the legal profession does, the regulating
monopoly should submit its criteria for approval to a third party, public
body, like a state Congressional committee.424 Second, with the added
reporting and writing requirements to maintain the MDP, this requires
additional regulatory oversight from state regulators. While both of these
oversight and enforcement features add to administrative costs, state
oversight of reporting and writing requirements could be as simple as
adding a filing feature to the state's secretary of state website for MDP law
firms.
Finally, the model still requires that lawyers maintain majority
ownership and control over the MDP form, which could continue to
perpetuate the professional inequalities within MDPs. Lawyers often
report that the nonlawyer professionals involved in an MDP provide
services that are just as, or in some cases can be even more, valuable than
the legal services provided. Requiring that nonlawyer professionals in an
MDP be subordinate to the lawyers perpetuates the monopoly and
elevated status that lawyers in the United States have come to enjoy and
expect, but that perception is changing, and black market MDPs who
provide equality of professions in providing professional services
recognize that and are often willing to risk potential sanctions for
promoting that equality and market advantage.
CONCLUSION
[I]t is not the most intellectual of the species that survives; it is not the
strongest hat survives; but the species that survives is the one that is able
best to adapt and adjust to the changing environment in which it finds
itself.
-Leon C. Megginson425
Regardless of the criticism this Article levels against previous
scholarly classifications and regulatory proposals, the purpose of this
Article is to act as a wake-up call for the legal profession and to urge the
424 See Ogus, supra note 15, at 103-06.
425 Leon C. Megginson, Lessons from Europe for American Business, 44 Sw. Soc. ScI. Q. 3, 4
(1963).
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ABA to amend its Model Rules of Professional Conduct to allow for
lawyers to stay professionally competitive and provide clients with
collaborative and holistic legal and nonlegal services to better serve their
needs. The failure to recognize and regulate MDPs over the past three or
so decades has created a class of gray and black market legal service
providers who operate just outside of the sanctioned ethical rules.
While this Article does critique the legal profession's method of self-
regulation and the need to restructure its ethical rules to bifurcate the
types of legal services that lawyers provide to clients, such revisions are
unlikely to occur before the ABA needs to address the MDP issue again
on a practical matter. This Article does argue that the ABA should at least
remove its proscriptive ban on MDPs so that other states may feel more
comfortable listening to its lawyer constituency and allowing MDP
operations. A broad, non-proscriptive authorization would also continue
to fuel the development of additional innovation in the realm of
collaborative and innovative legal services delivery, especially for low-
and moderate-income clients, as the ABA's own Committee on the
Future of Legal Services stresses the need to do.426
Particular rules can be adopted which address issues of lawyer
independence, confidentiality, and conflicts of interest in a way that does
not harm clients and does not hinder the collaborative structure or
equality among professionals involved in an MDP. Further, clients and
lawyers who offer services to clients in an MDP demonstrate the benefits
of holistic professional services as well. Surely protecting the legal
profession at the expense of client services should be the ABA's focal
point.
As other countries and scholars provide classification schemes and
numerous potential regulatory methods for MDPs, the ABA and the legal
profession are failing to grasp the urgency with which lawyers must face
this issue head on. While the MDP bans are predicated on stopping the
encroachment from the accounting profession into the legal services
market, that ship has sailed-time for the legal profession to enter the
race.




ABA Model R. of Prof. Conduct R. 5.4, Professional Independence
of a Lawyer
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer,
except that:
(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or
associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable
period of time after the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or
more specified persons;
(2) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or
disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to
the estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon purchase
price;
(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a
compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole
or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement; and
(4) a lawyer may share court-awarded legal fees with a nonprofit
organization that employed, retained or recommended employment of
the lawyer in the matter.
(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of
the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs,
or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate
the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services.
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional
corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:
(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary
representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of
the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;
(2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof or occupies
the position of similar responsibility in any form of association other than
a corporation; or
(3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional
judgment of a lawyer.
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